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VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
The following paper is concerned with a comprehensive examination of New 
Zealand's Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. Chapter II informs the reader 
about how referendums in general and in New Zealand fit into the context of 
democracy or direct democracy, respectively. It will be shown that New Zealand 
experienced a raft of local and national referendums in its history. Chapter III then 
provides an overview of the history of referendums in New Zealand and a history 
of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993. In Chapter IV, the actual process of 
citizens-initiated referendums under the Act will be explained. 
Chapter V elaborates on some practical problems of the Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Act 1993. First, the role of the Clerk of the House of Representatives in 
the CIR process will be scrutinised. I argue that the instruments the Clerk was 
provided with to perform the task of determining referendum questions is less 
than sufficient. Secondly, difficulties resulting from referendum questions as such 
will be examined. On the basis of actual CIR questions, I contend that some 
problems are referendum-inherent and some can be ascribed to flaws in the 
legislation. Thirdly, subject-matter restrictions on referendum questions will be 
analysed. I take the view that there are three groups of questions that should be 
excluded beforehand. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 12,400 words. 
III 
YOU'RE THE VOICE - TRY AND UNDERSTAND IT: SOME PRACTICAL 
PROBLEMS OF THE CITIZENS INITIATED REFERENDA ACT 
I INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand is unique. Surely many reasons are conceivable to support this 
flattering appraisal. However, the introductory statement relates in this context to 
a comparatively new feature of New Zealand 's political system, the Citizens 
Initiated Referenda Act 1993 (CIR Act). Its long title divulges that this Act: 1 
provide[s] for the holding, on specific questions, of citizens initiated referenda, the results of 
which referenda will indicate the views held by the people of New Zealand on specific 
questions but will not be binding on the New Zealand Government. 
Many countries in the world have experience with direct democracy. Indeed, 
since 1945, the only democracies that have not held a national vote on a specific 
issue are Costa Rica, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Mexico and 
the USA.2 However, where other governments are required to act on the wishes of 
their voters, New Zealand is unique in having non-binding citizens-initiated 
referendums (CIRs).3 
This paper has two parts. In Part One, CIRs will be examined from a 
theoretical perspective. It will be shown how CIRs fit into the context of 
democracy as such, how this system developed in New Zealand and how it works. 
Part Two then provides an analysis of the practical difficulties resulting from the 
introduction of the CIR Act, such as the role of the Clerk of the House, the 
inherent problems of referendum questions and subject-matter restrictions. 
1 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, Long Title. 
2 Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) 57. 
3 The plural of the term referendum proves to be contentious among the scholars. Some use the 
latin version "referenda" (including the CIR Act itself) and some employ the anglo-saxon 
version "referendums". In this paper, the term "referendums" has been used, as it is arguably 
common parlance and etymologically more respectable; see David Butler and Austin Ranney 
(eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and Theory (American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research Press, Washington, D.C. , 1978) 4-5; Jack H Nagel Participation 
(Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J ., 1987) 90. 
II REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRACY 
A Democracy 
CIRs are a form of direct democracy. Direct democracy, in turn, is a form of 
democracy. This causal chain, which will be elaborated on in the following 
chapters, demonstrates the close link between an analysis of the CIR Act and the 
debate about democracy in general. Therefore, in order to understand the issues, it 
is important to have an overview of what democracy actually is and of its major 
forms and functions. 
The term democracy is derived from Greek ("demos" means people and 
"kratos" means rule, authority or power) and translates as the "power of the 
people". It is a form of government in which the people are sovereign. A rather 
simple definition, declared by Abraham Lincoln, describes democracy as 
"government of the people, by the people and for the people".4 A more elaborate 
description may be that "in a democracy important public decisions on questions 
of law and policy depend, directly or indirectly, upon public opinion formally 
expressed by citizens of the community, the vast bulk of whom have equal 
political rights".5 In general terms, a democracy is a form of government in which 
the people have the right to control their own destiny. They have the "ultimate 
authority"6 and the right to make or at least influence decisions that affect their 
everyday lives. 
Democracy had its beginnings in certain of the city-states of ancient Greece. 
Greek democracy, however, was a brief historical episode, followed by a gap of 
2,000 years in its practice. 7 There was a time, less than a century ago, when 
"democrat" was a term of abuse. Today its connotations are honorable, as 
democracy is now widely seen as the best method to use for government. 8 
4 Cited in Catt, above, 4; Arend Lijphard Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, J 999) J. 
5 Albert Weale Democracy (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1999) 14. 
6 The Encyclopedia Americana (international ed, Grolier, Danbury, Conn., 1985) vol 8, Corot to 
Desdemona, 684. 
7 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 15 ed, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1988) vol 4, 5. 
8 Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) 4; The Encyclopedia 
Americana, above, 684. 
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Democracy has different manifestations, depending upon the ways in which 
people can exercise and indeed influence the government. Across every continent 
democracy is desired, but there is little agreement on exactly how to achieve it. 
Each country has its own set of procedures, each claiming to be democratic but 
based on a distinctive attitude towards how to achieve democracy.9 New Zealand 
implemented CIRs in 1993. The speeches in Parliament during the introduction of 
the Bill revealed that this happened with the intention to improve democracy. 10 
Thus, there is a variety of forms and modifications that democratic governments 
can take. The major categorisations will be outlined in the following. 
Arend Lijphard divided democracy into majoritarian and consensual forms, 
examined from the perspective of how decisions in a democracy are evaluated. 
Whereas in a majoritarian system achieving a majority of the people 's votes is the 
decisive factor, in a consensual system the aim is consensus or as many people as 
possible. The latter system accepts majority rule only as a minimum requirement, 
but seeks to maximise the size of these majorities.11 However, since unanimity 
among human beings about matters of great and topical concern is impossible, the 
majority principle, insofar as it truly respects the existence of human rights, is the 
only one that makes democracy a viable system. 12 
Most commonly, democracy is classified according to how and by who 
decisions are made. One can distinguish between direct and indirect democracies. 
In direct democracy, political decisions are exercised directly by the whole body 
of citizens who thus choose the content of public policy. 13 Mostly, the citizens 
decide on specific questions that are posed for them in a referendum. Participatory 
democracy is a form of direct democracy where the people rule by collectively 
discussing issues and agreeing on the best solution for the group. 14 This form of 
democracy was applied in the ancient city-states of Greece in which the whole 
body formed the legislature, a system only made possible by the small populations 
9 Catt, above, 4. 
10 DAM Graham, Minister of Justice (JO March 1992) 522 NZPD 6724; Christine Fletcher (JO 
March 1992) 522 NZPD 6713; Murray McCully (JO March 1992) 522 NZPD 6709. 
11 Arend Lijphard Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999) 2. 
12 The Encyciopedia Americana (International ed, Grolier, Danbury, Conn., 1985) vol 8, Corot to 
Desdemona, 685. 
13 Albert Weale Democracy (St. Martin 's Press, New York, 1999) 24. 
14 Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) 13: Catt, however, puts 
participatory democracy in a category of its own. 
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of these states. 15 The counterpart to direct democracy is indirect democracy or 
representative democracy, a form of democracy, in which a few are elected to 
make decisions for the group. The use of elected representatives instead of having 
all people meeting together can be attributed to the reality of large populations.
16 
To ensure leadership accountability, it is essential to provide both a free and fair 
electoral system and a wide range of checks and balances by means of a 
framework of constitutional restraints designed to guarantee all citizens the 
enjoyment of certain individual or collective rights. 17 This variation of 
representative democracy is often called liberal or constitutional democracy.
18 
B Direct Democracy 
As discussed above, the major forms of democracy are representative and 
direct democracy. However, there are also distinctions within the direct 
democracy category. As its long title states, the CIR Act allows citizens to answer 
specific questions to indicate their view. The referendums held under this Act are 
thus a means of direct democracy. 
Direct democracy in contrast to representative democracy seems to be the 
only term that is agreed upon in the literature. The classification of the different 
forms of direct democracy and especially its marking is widely divergent.
19 
Walker. for example, states that "the main line of classification is between the 
initiative on the one hand and the referendum on the other" and goes on to add 
that "the initiative itself obviously involves the holding of a referendum".20 Some 
15 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (15 ed, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1988) vol 4, 5. 
16 Catt, above, 14. 
17 Robert A Dahl On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998) 14; The New 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, above, 5. 
18 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, above, 5; Catt, above, 13 . 
19 See Catt, above, 57: "The literature varies in the use of specific terms .... "; Bonnie Laxton-
Blinkhom Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation of Citizens 
Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 12: "Many 
writers use these definitions very loosely .... " and "Confusion can be exacerbated by the 
incorporation of the various sub-categories of initiatives and Referenda .. . . "; Jack H Nagel 
Participation (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. , 1987) 90-3. 
20 Geoffrey de Q Walker Initiative and Referendum : The People 's Law (Centre for independent 
Studies Press, St. Leonards, NSW, 1987) 11 ; Lijphard places Referendums and Initiatives in the 
same category whereas Butler and Ranney distinguish between lnitiative and Referendums: 
4 
David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study of Practice and 
Theory (American Enterprise lnstitute for Public Policy Research Press, Washington, DC, 1978) 
6; Arend Lijphard Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
of this uncertainty is also country-related, as the Swiss "facultative", for instance, 
is the same as the U.S. "referendum".21 The literature also often uses "initiative 
and referendum" seemingly in a tautological way.22 However, whereas "direct 
democracy" is a term to distinguish direct from representative democracy, the 
expression "referendum" can be used as a generic term for the technical or 
procedural mechanism that allows voters to decide directly on an issue. A 
referendum can therefore be regarded as the practical instrument of direct 
democracy and occurs itself in various manifestations. 
The following chapter briefly considers the arguments for and against direct 
democracy and describes the diverse forms of referendums, both in general and 
regarding the experience with different forms of referendums in New Zealand. 
1 Arguments for and against direct democracy 
Arguments against and in favour of the two kinds of democracy exist m 
profusion. Some of the most important arguments will be outlined briefly. 
Among arguments in favour of direct democracy, legitimacy arguments loom 
large.23 It is contended that direct democracy increases the legitimacy of the legal 
and/or political system, because laws instituted as a result of referendums are 
more clearly and directly derived from the popular expression of the people 's 
will.24 The best way to ensure that government reigns on behalf of a sovereign 
people, it is argued, is to allow the majority of the people to make their own 
decisions on particular topics.25 This, in turn, will promote government 
responsiveness and accountability, as officials cannot ignore the voter 's voice 
Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984) 199; see also Laxton-
Blinkhorn, above, I I. 
21 See Catt, above, 57-8 (Table 4.2). 
22 Walker, above, 10; Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 
168; see also Laxton-Blinkhom, above, 12: "Referenda and lnitiatives are often spoken about in 
the same breath .... ". 
23 John Parkinson Who Knows Best: the Creation of the Citizens-initiated Referendum in New 
Zealand <http://socpol.anu.edu.au/- parkinson/nzcir.pdt> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
24 Walker, above, 50. 
25 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 172. 
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with impunity.26 By allowing for greater participation, it is believed that voter 
apathy and alienation can be overcome, thereby bringing the government closer to 
the people.27 Furthermore, people can place subjects on the political agenda that 
are, in their opinion, not adequately discussed.28 Among some advocates 
arguments against direct democracy are claimed as arguments against democracy 
itself. Accordingly, Bogdanor states that "in the last resort, the arguments against 
the referendum are also arguments against democracy, while acceptance of the 
referendum is but a logical consequence of accepting a democratic form of 
government".29 Budge indirectly queries the system of representative democracy 
by questioning why ordinary people should be allowed to choose governments by 
means of regular elections, if one does not grant them the capability to make 
important direct decisions on particular issues. 30 
However, for every claim put forward on behalf of direct democracy, there is 
an equally powerful criticism. It is argued that referendums as the means of direct 
democracy could undermine the effectiveness of an elected government, because 
popular decisions lessen the responsibility of its members.31 Moreover, 
referendums as a majoritarian instrument are believed to jeopardise minority 
rights if majorities at the ballot box are less sensitive than elected representatives 
to the rights of minorities.32 The pivotal reasoning is the reputed lack of 
competence or even indifference among the voters to decide on complex policy 
and constitutional questions.33 This last argument is closely connected with 
genuine practical difficulties such as how to frame the question, the provision of 
information or a low voter turnout. The main emphasis of this paper is to examine 
26 Thomas E Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989) I 0. 
27 Cronin, above, 11. 
28 
Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 10. 
29 Vernon Bogdanor The people and the Party System: the Referendum and Electoral Reform in 
British Politics (Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981) 93. 
30 Ian Budge The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996) 2-3. 3 1 Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 173; Janet 
McLean "Making More (or Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-Initiated Referenda" in 
Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 364, 
367. 
32 
Thomas E Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989) 212. 
33 
Geoffrey de Q Walker initiative and Referendum : The People's Law (Centre for Independent 
Studies Press, St. Leonards, NSW, 1987) 68. 
6 
these practical problems on the basis of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
in New Zealand. 
2 Different forms of referendums in general 
In this paper on CIRs, referendums are categorised according to the triggering 
momentum.34 That being the case, one can distinguish between constitutional 
referendums (if a constitutional provision is the causal factor), government-
initiated referendums (if the government is the driving force which puts an issue 
to the voters) and citizens-initiated referendums (if the populace gives the 
impetus).35 
If the constitution requires that any intended change to the constitution be 
approved by referendum, one speaks of a constitutional referendum. Parliament 
may enact a standing provision that certain constitutional amendments are to be 
enacted only if they are supported by a majority of voters in a referendum. The 
democratic case for such a requirement rests on the argument that the sovereign 
people should be entitled to decide on their own fundamental set of values.36 
Issues that have been put to the voters by government are termed 
government-initiated referendums. Harris notes that only non-constitutional 
matters can be subject of government-initiated referendums37, as the separate 
category for constitutional referendums embraces all constitutional matters. 
However, it is quite possible that a government may sponsor a referendum on a 
constitutional issue. To be consistent with the above given classifying factor (the 
triggering momentum), constitutional matters that have been put to the voters by 
government are arguably also part of government-initiated referendums. The 
34 See Paul Harris "Democracy and Referendums" in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: 
Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1992) 47, 48-
62; McLean, above, 364-5. 
35 Sometimes constitutional referendums are incorporated into government-initiated referendums: 
see McLean, above, 364-5. 
36 Harris, above, 49. 
37 Harris, above, 54-5. 
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outcome of referendums that have been sponsored by government can be either 
legally binding or non-binding. 38 
The third form of referendums is citizens-initiated referendums. In general 
terms, this process allows electors to propose and then vote on their own 
legislation. CIRs can occur in various forms which enable electors to: 
• directly approve or reject particular laws that have passed through Parliament 
but have not yet taken effect, 
• to petition for a referendum which is not binding on the government, 
• to compel the repeal or enactment of a law; or 
• to recall public officials and elected representatives. 
The designation of these types of CIRs differs widely for no apparent 
reason.39 The Royal Commission on the Electoral System states, however, that 
referendums demanded by a certain number of voters are known as an 
"initiative".40 Although other forms of referendums are also initiated by either the 
Government or the Constitution and in spite of partially dissenting terminology in 
the literature, 41 the common parlance supports this assertion. In this paper, 
therefore, the term "initiative" is used synonymously with CIRs. 
3 Different forms of referendums in New Zealand 
The government has always been capable of referring particular issues to the 
electorate and over the years it has occasionally done so to test public opinion. 
38 Mark W Gobbi "We, the Sovereign: Clarifying the Call for Direct Democracy in New Zealand" 
in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1992) 156, 159. 
39 For example, Press, following Butler and Ranney, calls the introduction and the repeal of a law 
statutory initiative or citizens referendum, respectively; Walker and Gobbi call these forms 
legislative initiative (according to Press a legislative initiative is sponsored by government), 
legislative referendum or popular referendum: see Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding 
Citizens Initiated Referenda in NC!W Zealand (MPP Research Paper, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2000) 3; David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums: A Comparative Study 
of Practice and Theory (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Press, 
Washington, DC, 1978) 23-4.; Geoffrey de Q Walker Initiative and Referendum : The People's 
law (Centre for Independent Studies Press, St. Leonards, NSW, 1987) 12; Gobbi, above, 159. 40 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 167; Helena Catt 
Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) 60. 
41 See Part II B Direct Democracy; see also notes 19, 20. 
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The subsequent chapter discusses the historical background of these government-
initiated referendums. Apart from the liquor licensing polls and the referendum on 
the electoral system in 1993, however, these referendums were indicative only. 
Before a government-initiated referendum can be held, the government must pass 
special legislation to authorise the holding of a referendum, including the 
particular question to be asked.42 The subjects of the government-sponsored 
referendums that have so far been held have been constitutional issues and 
contentious moral issues, such as liquor licensing or gambling. In the latter cases, 
the referendum can be seen as a modified version of the parliamentary "free" or 
"conscience vote", when party discipline is not applied.43 
The New Zealand legal and political system operates on the basis that 
Parliament has supreme lawmaking powers that cannot be challenged. 
Furthermore, New Zealand's constitutional arrangements are not found in a single 
written document, known as a Constitution. These fundamental features of the 
constitutional system make constitutional referendums rather difficult. A 
constitutional referendum which enacts a Constitution is an exercise of popular 
sovereignty and contradicts therefore with the notion of parliamentary sovereignty 
that prevails in New Zealand.44 An unwritten or not fully entrenched constitution, 
moreover, 1s readily susceptible to hastily change, instigated by popular vote. 
Furthermore, the lack of a Constitution poses the problem that New Zealand 
courts do not have the power to declare unconstitutional referendum results null 
and void. A Constitution, however, could confer this power on the courts, as 
happened in California.45 At least regarding binding constitutional referendums 
42 Paul Harris "Democracy and Referendums" in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional 
and Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1992) 47, 57; Helena Catt 
"Citizens ' initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government and Politics 
(Oxford University Press, Auckland, 200 I) 386, 387. 
43 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (2 ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997) 
283; Helena Catt, Paul Harris and Nigel S Roberts Voter's Choice: Electoral Change in New 
Zealand? (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, NZ, 1992) 138. 
44 F M Brookfield "Referendums: Legal and Constitutional Aspects" in Alan Simpson (ed) 
Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 
1992) 7, 20; Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhom Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the 
Operation of Citizens initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1996) 36. 
45 DAM Graham (14 September I 993) 538 NZPD I 7952. 
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scholars therefore consider it "essential to ensure that there are appropriate 
constitutional safeguards" .46 
With the introduction of the Electoral Act 1956 and its successor, the 
Electoral Act 1993, New Zealand's constitution was provided with a standing 
statutory provision for constitutional referendums.47 Under section 268 of the 
Electoral Act, certain sections of the Electoral Act and the Constitution Act 1986 
are singly entrenched, which means that these provisions can only be amended or 
repealed unless it is passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the members of the 
House of Representatives or has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast 
at a referendurn.48 The 1990 referendum on the parliamentary term was based on 
these provisions. 49 
Since the introduction of the CIR Act, New Zealand has also experience with 
the third category of referendums, those triggered by a certain number of citizens. 
The Government of New Zealand chose an indicative, i.e. non-binding, version 
only. In the following chapters, the historical background, the process of CIRs 
based on the CIR Act as well as practical problems will be discussed in detail. The 
concept of direct democracy informs the arguments of CIR advocates and vice 
versa. so The core aims of the CIR Act, as emerged from the speeches made in 
Parliament during its passage were to: 
• increase popular participation in the decision-making process;51 
• help ensure that the will of the people prevails, rather than that of their elected 
representatives, thus making government more responsive to public opinion;52 
and 
46 J H Wallace "Commentary on 'Referendums: Legal and Constitutional Aspects' " in Alan 
Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1992) 26, 28-30. 
47 Brookfield, above, 13-6. 
48 Electoral Act 1993, s 268 (2) (a), (b ); Section 268, however, is not itself entrenched (no double 
entrenchment) and can therefore be amended or repealed by single majority of the Members of 
Parliament. 
49 
Electoral Act 1956, s 189 ( I) (a) in connection with Constitution Act I 986, s 17 (I); see Paul 
Harris "Democracy and Referendums" in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and 
Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1992) 47, 50; Helena Catt, Paul 
Harris and Nigel S Roberts Voter's Choice: Electoral Change in New Zealand? (Dunmore 
Press, Palmerston North, NZ, 1992) 131-2. 
5° Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 5. 
51 DAM Graham (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6703. 
52 Graham, above, 6705 . 
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• provide an alternative channel for the public to place issues on the political 
agenda as an attempt to diminish the political disillusionment of the 
populace. 53 
C Conclusion 
Arend Lijphard asserted that there are many ways of successfully running a 
democracy, but although the principles are clear, the details remain to be filled 
in.54 The New Zealand Government decided in 1993 that CIRs are such a detail, 
accompanied by the hope to improve and strengthen the democratic system. In 
theory, CIRs are certainly a means to achieve this aim. However, if they are also a 
feasible objective will be analysed in the chapter on practical problems of the CIR 
Act. 
III HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Notions of direct governance go back at least as far as ancient Athens, the 
assemblies of the Saxon tribes and the plebiscite in the Roman Republic. 55 
Optional referendums or plebiscites were also occasionally held in medieval 
Europe, whilst various forms of direct popular governance have been in use in 
Swiss cantons since the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.56 In the mid-seventeenth 
century the first modem direct democratic elements emerged in England and the 
United States. 57 Since 1840, New Zealanders have repeatedly restructured their 
governmental system in various forms, 58 including the inauguration of 
referendums. The historical roots of direct democracy in New Zealand are subject 
of the following chapter. 
53 D A M Graham ( 14 September 1993) 53 8 NZPD 17963. 
54 Arend Lijphard Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-
One Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984) 4. 
55 Thomas E Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989) 41. 
56 Cronin, above, 41 . 
57 Cronin, above, 41. 
58 Mark W Gobbi "We, The Sovereign: Clarifying the Call for Direct Democracy in New Zealand" 
in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1992) 156. 
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A History of Referendums in New Zealand 
New Zealand has a long history of involving its citizens in the decision-
making processes of government. 59 Local option polls on the control of liquor 
licensing were first held alongside general elections in 1894. In each district 
electors could choose between prohibition, reduction in the number of licences or 
continuance. Once a district had gone "dry", the choice would be between 
prohibition or restoration.6° From 1919, in all "wet" districts the local option was 
dropped and a national referendum on liquor sale and distribution was instituted. 
The voters were asked to decide between "national continuance", "state control" 
or "national prohibition". This triennial referendum was continued to be held at 
every general election until 1987.61 Local option licensing referendums, however, 
are still held in conjunction with each general election in the five remaining "dry" 
districts of Eden, Grey Lynn, Roskill, Tawa and Wellington East.62 
The statement that, prior to the CIR Act, all referendums in New Zealand had 
been instigated by the Government63 is only true for the national level. On the 
local level, citizens were able to initiate polls regarding the change of the rating 
system and to trigger a popular vote regarding the amalgamation of local 
authorities from 1886 to 1988.64 Besides these polls, non-binding referendums 
may be directed by any local authority according to Section 121 of the Local 
Elections and Polls Act65 and have indeed been held on various occasions.66 In 
59 Colin James and Alan McRobie Turning Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond (Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 318. 
60 GA Wood Governing New Zealand(Longman Paul, Auckland, 1988) 131: "Sixty per cent were 
required to carry prohibition and after that, sixty per cent to end prohibition." (restoration). 
61 The last national liquor licensing referendum took place at the general election 1987. The actual 
abolition provided for the Sale of Liquor Act of 1989: see Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer 
Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (3 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 202; The Working Party on Liquor had recommended in 1986 that all licensing 
polls be abolished and the Royal Commission on the Electoral System had agreed: Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1986) 168. 
62 See Sale of Liquor Act 1989, ss 249-253. 
63 Stephen Church Crime and Punishment: The Referenda to Reform the Criminal Justice System 
and Reduce the Size of Parliament in Jonathan Boston and others (eds) left turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 184. 
64 See for more details G A Wood Governing New Zealand (Longman Paul, Auckland, 1988) 130; 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 168. 
65 The Local Elections and Polls Act 1976, s 121. 
66 See Kenneth A Palmer Local Government Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Law Book, Sydney, 
NSW, 1993) 153-4. 
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1992 and 1994, respectively, the Tauranga District Council and the Hamilton City 
Council even initiated of their own volition the right of citizens to compel a 
referendum to be conducted.67 Against this background, it would be interesting to 
examine if lessons can be learned from the local level that can be applied to the 
national level. Alas, there seems to be no relevant literature regarding this 
question68 and in the debate over the introduction of the CIR Bill, no speaker drew 
conclusions from any experience on the local level. 
By the time most local polls were abolished, the scope of national 
referendums had already been widened.69 Until the present day, apart from the 
national liquor licensing polls, nine nation-wide referendums on both moral and 
constitutional topics have been put to the voters.70 In 1949, a "vintage year for 
referendums",71 three government-initiated and indicative issues were referred to 
the electors. In March 1949 the proposal whether to extend closing time for public 
(licensed) hotels from 6 pm to 10 pm was defeated, 72 whereas the proposal 
whether to legalise off-course betting on horse races was carried. 73 The third 
issue, in August 1949, asked for peace-time conscription and was also answered 
in the affirmative by the voters. 74 
As was stated above, an entrenching provision was included in the Electoral 
Act from 1956. Section 189 of the Electoral Act stipulates that the term of 
parliament can only be amended or repealed if the proposal for the amendment or 
repeal has been passed by a majority of 75 percent of all the Members of 
Parliament or has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the 
electors. Consequently, the 1967 question on whether the term of parliament 
should be extended from three to four years has been put to the people in terms of 
67 Graham Bush Local Government & Politics in New Zealand (2 ed, Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1995) 292. 
68 Relevant literature regarding public participation on the local level hardly mentions referendums 
or polls: see Murray F Douglas Public Participation in New Zealand Local Government (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1986); Warrawoot Thiensirisak Citizen 
Participation in New Zealand Local Government (MA Thesis, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1990). 
69 G A Wood Governing New Zealand (Longman Paul, Auckland, 1988) 130; Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1986) 132. 
70 See Appendix I for more details. 
71 Colin James and Alan McRobie Turning Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond (Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 318. 
72 Defeated by 75.5 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix f for details. 
73 Carried by 68 .0 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix I for details. 
74 Carried by 77.9 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix I for details. 
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Section 189 of the Electoral Act 1956. The electors voted to retain the three-year 
term. 75 Also in 1967, voters had to decide again if they wanted hotel licensing 
hours to be extended. This time the proposal was carried by the majority of the 
electors. 76 
The referendum questions proved to be repetitive. In 1990, the proposal 
whether to extend the parliamentary term to four years was on the agenda again. 
However, on this question the voters did not change their mind. Once more they 
decided to retain the three-year term. 
77 
In 1992, New Zealanders were asked to vote on two questions. First, they had 
to decide whether they wanted to retain the existing first-past-the-post electoral 
system or change to a proportional representation system
78 and secondly, if a 
majority of voters supported change, which one of four different voting systems 
they would prefer. 79 This referendum was only indicative. As a majority favoured 
change, a third and binding referendum was held alongside the 1993 general 
election to determine the particular type of electoral system to be adopted. The 
voters gave their sanction to the Mixed-Member Proportional system.
80 The most 
recent of the nine government-initiated referendums since 1949 took place m 
1997 when the government asked in an indicative postal ballot whether to 
introduce compulsory superannuation savings. The proposal was defeated by the 
overwhelming majority of electors. 
81 
It became apparent that New Zealand experienced a multitude of different 
referendums in the past century. Hundreds of local referendums, 
82 31 triennial 
liquor licensing polls and nine government-initiated referendums on both moral 
and constitutional issues have been held. New Zealanders, therefore, were not 
completely unprepared for having their say before the introduction of the CIR Act 
1993. 
75 Defeated by 68.1 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix l for details. 
76 Carried by 64.4 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix l for details. 
77 Defeated by 69 .3 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix l for details. 
78 84 .7 % of valid votes cast in support of change; see Appendix I for details. 
79 70.5 % of valid votes cast in support of Mixed-Member Proportional system (MMP); see 
Appendix l for details ; see also Colin James and Alan McRobie Turning Point: The 1993 
Election and Beyond (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 3 I 8-9. 
80 53 .86 % of valid votes cast in support of Mixed-Member Proportional system (MMP); see 
Appendix I for details. 
81 Defeated by 91 .8 % of the valid votes cast; see Appendix I for details. 
82 GA Wood Governing New Zealand (Longman Paul, Auckland, 1988) 130. 
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B History of the CIR Act 
Shortly before the end of the legislative term, on 28 September 1993, the CIR 
Act was passed by Parliament. The right of citizens to initiate a referendum on 
any self-chosen issue, if needs be against the will of the government, had been 
introduced. This part considers the historical development of the CIR Act 1993. 
In 1893, a Referendum Bill was first introduced to Parliament. Although this 
Bill only provided for non-binding government-controlled referendums, it 
involved the country in a similar debate about whether direct democracy should 
be part of the established constitutional framework as in California and 
Switzerland at the same time. 83 The arguments in favour of the Referendum Bill, 
brought forward by MP Eugene Joseph O'Conor in the fust hearing in Parliament, 
were similar to those advanced in the debate about the introduction of the CIR 
Act. It was argued that the Referendum Bill would increase the power of the 
electors, the lawful sovereign, to exercise a direct check upon the legislation.84 
O'Conor also sensed that the people of New Zealand were dissatisfied with the 
proceedings in the legislature. 85 He therefore believed that giving the electors a 
more direct voice in the legislation would counteract this displeasure within the 
population at the state of representative democracy. 86 However, the majority of 
the Members of the House disapproved this proposal and decided against a second 
hearing. The Referendum Bill was reintroduced several times in modified 
versions and the parliamentary debate simmered for a few years until it eventually 
petered out in 1906. 87 The discussion was only interrupted until the Social 
Democratic Party introduced the Popular Initiative and Referendum Bill in 1918 
and 1919 and resuscitated the political dialogue again. However, this second 
attempt also failed to win approval in Parliament and the issue of CIRs was 
withdrawn from the political agenda for the time being. Representative democracy 
83 Mark W Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin and 
Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1994) 200. 
84 Eugene Joseph O'Conor ( I O August 1893) 80 NZPD 564-5. 
85 O'Conor, above, 567. 
86 O 'Conor, above, 564-5. 
87 Mark W Gobbi The Quest for legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin and 
Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1994) 202 with further evidence; Craig Joseph Press The Case for 
Binding Citizens initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Research Paper, Victoria University 
of Wellington, 2000) 13 . 
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in New Zealand had not acquired the same nefarious reputation as it had for 
instance in Switzerland or California.88 The political system of New Zealand, a 
classical Westminster democracy, worked for many years fairly satisfactory. 
Election manifestos and the decisions of the winning party were matching most of 
the time. As set out above, some important questions have been put to the voters 
directly. Considerable demands of the citizens for additional direct influence had 
not been raised. Eventually, in 1984, the direct democracy debate resurfaced when 
the Democrats introduced the Popular Initiatives Bill, which would have enabled a 
100,000 electors to trigger a non-binding referendum. 89 The Private Member's 
Bill did not pass Parliament, but the political discourse on direct democracy was 
back on the political agenda. 
The observation that the demand for greater participation usually increases 
with a growth in the level of distrust of legislative bodies and the suspicion that 
privileged interests exert far greater influence on politicians than do the electors
90 
proved to be true for New Zealand in the following years. The public perception 
of political behaviour changed with the downswing of the economy, instigated by 
the politics of the Fourth Labour Government (1984-1990). The latter moved 
rapidly after being elected to dismantle the welfare state, ostensibly because it was 
no longer sustainable.91 Their policies led to high levels of unemployment and 
contributed to the New Zealand stock market crash in October 1987, leading in 
turn to a sense of disillusionment, alienation or political apathy among the 
population.92 These sentiments were echoed by various interest groups and 
politicians who supported the adoption of a system of CIRs. 93 
The Democrats94 were the first to restart the debate about CIRs on a political 
level by introducing their Popular Initiatives Bill in 1983. The Bill was deferred 
pending the findings of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System, which 
was established by the Labour Government in 1985. The Commission was, among 
other tasks, instructed to review "to what extent referenda should be used to 
88 Gobbi, above, 203-4. 
89 Gobbi, above, 206-7; D A M Graham, Minister of Justice (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 
17953. 
90 Thomas E Cronin Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989) I 0. 
91 Gobbi, above, l 98. 
92 Gobbi, above, 198-9. 
93 Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 14. 
94 The party was originally called Social Credit Party. It changed its name into New Zealand 
Democratic Party (NZDP) in 1985: see Gobbi, above 205. 
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determine controversial issues, the appropriateness of provisions governing the 
conduct of referenda, and whether referenda should be legislatively binding".95 
The Royal Commission did not conclude in favour of referendums, called them 
"blunt and crude devices"96 and recommended that legislation allowing the public 
to initiate referenda not be enacted.97 However, the advocates of CIR had already 
marshalled and, supported by the growing dissatisfaction with the unresponsive 
style of politicians, their demands fell on sympathetic ears, not only in public but 
also on the political stage. Lobby groups such as the group Freedom and 
Individual Responsibility (FAIR), the One New Zealand Foundation, Voter 's 
Voice, New Zealand Citizens Movement or Coalition of Concerned Citizens98 
sprang up like mushrooms and disseminated their attitude towards direct 
democracy throughout the country. 
Eventually, the activities of these groups caught the attention of political 
entrepreneurs within the National Party, above all party member Merv Rusk, who 
launched the matter on an influential political platform. High pressure inside 
National Party by means of persistent campaigning and supported by National 
Reform, a lobby group within the party, induced National to include a promise to 
introduce non-binding direct democracy legislation in its 1990 election 
manifesto.99 The National Party won the 1990 general election and the legislative 
process was instigated immediately. However, it took another two years until the 
CIR Bill was eventually introduced to Parliament. The first reading of the Bill in 
Parliament on 10 March 1992 was very controversial. The speakers for the 
National Government emphasised especially that the Bill contributed to the 
improvement and consolidation of New Zealand 's democratic tradition. 100 The 
then Minister of Justice recalled that New Zealand's political system with a 
95 Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 167. 
96 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 175. 
97 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 176. 
98 See for details Mark W Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of 
the Origin and Role of Direct Democracy in Swit=erland, California, and New Zealand (LLM 
Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 212-20. 
99 Gabriela Wehrle "The Firefighters ' Referendum - Should Questions Arising from Industrial 
Disputes be Excluded from Referenda Held under the Citizens initiated Referenda Act 1993?" 
(1997) 27 VUWLR 273 , 275; Helena Catt "The Other Democratic Experiment: New Zealand 's 
Experience with Citizens ' Initiated Referendum" (1996) 48 Political Science 29, 30. 
100 D A M Graham (I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6724; Christine Fletcher (I O March 1992) 522 
NZPD 6713 ; Murray McCully (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6709. 
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unicameral Parliament vests very wide powers in the Government.
101 He therefore 
believed that "it is desirable for the people to have their voice heard, and the Bill 
provides a mechanism for that to occur". 102 Furthermore, the Bill would also 
allow the electorate for some checks and balances on the powerful Government 
"that the public believes has largely gone out of control".
103 
The discussion also touched on the important question as to whether elected 
representatives have the right to govern without interference or comment from the 
electorate during the electoral term. Labour MP David Lange declared that "the 
Government should be allowed to govern until such time as it ... is turfed out at a 
general election". 104 The Minister of Justice rejected this view and replied that the 
Government remains responsive to the people after the election and that the Bill 
helps "ensure that to the greatest extent possible it is the will of the people that 
prevails, rather than that of their elected representatives". 105 
The second and third reading on 14 September 1993 were rather less 
contentious regarding fundamental principles of democracy. Noteworthy is, 
however, that the Minister of Justice regarded it as a core aim that the Bill gives 
the people "an opportunity to raise an issue that they believe to be important"
106 
and thus providing a means for the electorate to place issues on the political 
agenda. During the second and third reading in Parliament, the speakers mainly 
focussed on practical problems such as the designated role of the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives. 107 The CIR Bill eventually passed into law in 
September 1993. 
The comparatively long time from the instigation of the legislative process in 
1990 until the coming into law in 1993 is not only attributable to practical 
101 See also Arend Lijphard Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984) 19. 
102 Graham, above, 6703. 
103 Christine Fletcher {I O March I 992) 522 NZPD 6713 ; Murray McCully (I O March 1992) 522 
NZPD 6709. 
104 David Lange (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6706: following Burke 's theory of representation; 
see for a discussion Mark W Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional 
Study of lhe Origin and Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand 
(LLM Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 36-7, 267-8; see for the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility F M Brookfield "Referendums: Legal and Constitutional Aspects" in 
Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1992) 7, I 0-1. 
105 DAM Graham (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6723 , 6705 . 
106 DAM Graham (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17963. 
107 David Caygill (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17956; Robert Anderson (14 September 1993) 
538 NZPD 17957; Graham, above, 17962-3; this problem will be examined in a subsequent 
chapter. 
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difficulties, but rather to the hope of influential political circles, both within the 
Labour and National Party, that the demand for direct democratic elements would 
diminish and the CIR Bill would seep away in the legislative process. 108 This hope 
proved to be deceptive, however. The 1987 stock market crash, the anger in the 
population about too many undelivered election promises and the public 
perception of unresponsive politicians created the breeding ground on which 
demands of lobby and interest groups for CIRs could thrive. Thus, the CIR Act 
came into force on 1 February 1994. 
It is arguable that the introduction of the CIR Act resulted from partisan-
driven factors rather than from pure enthusiasm for direct democracy. 109 A 
political minority prevailed, supported by various populist interest groups and 
buoyed by a deep feeling of dissatisfaction with the political system among the 
populace. On the whole, New Zealand politics has actually been characterised by 
a high degree of popular responsiveness through the party system, frequent 
elections with high participation rates and other factors. 11 0 However, a number of 
ill-fated policies led to an opposite perception and public confidence in elected 
representatives sank to an all-time low. 111 Furthermore, the public perception of 
the CIR debate was clouded by the swirl of electoral reform that coincided with 
the passage of the CIR Act. 112 Consequently, the CIR Act came into force almost 
unnoticed by media and population. 113 The factors that led to the introduction of 
the CIR Act were after all rather unsavoury. Nonetheless, whether the content of 
the Act has proved to be successful will be examined within the framework of this 
paper. 
108 Mark W Gobbi The Quest for l egitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin 
and Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 298. 
109 Stephen Church Crime and Punishment: The Referenda to Reform the Criminal Justice System 
and Reduce the Size of Parliament in Jonathan Boston and others (eds) Left turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 186; John 
Parkinson Who Knows Best: the Creation of the Citizens-initiated Ref erendum in New Zealand 
<http://socpol.anu.edu.au/- parkinson/nzcir.pdt> (last accessed 22 September 2002) 8. 
110 Janet McLean "Making More (or Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-Initiated Referenda" 
in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 365. 
11 1 By October 1990, only 4.3 per cent of voters had confidence in the New Zealand Parliament: 
Heylen "Full Trust and Confidence" Polls quoted in Keith Jackson "Commentary on 
"Referendums: Legal and Constitutional Aspects" Parliamentary Sovereignty" in Alan Simpson 
(ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Department of Politics, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1992) 33, 39. 
112 See Caroline Morris "Citizens· Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44. 
113 Craig Joseph Press The Case f or Binding Citizens initiated Ref erenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 17. 
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IV THE PROCESS OF CIRS 
The procedure of the CIR Act is indispensable a knowledge if one seeks to 
analyse its practical difficulties. In the following, therefore, the course of CIRs 
according to the CIR Act will be discussed. 114 
The CIR Act 1993 invites the holding of indicative referenda. The word 
"petition" is very often used in the relevant literature and even in the official 
publications. This points to the, at least partial, similarities between the ancient 
right of citizens to sign a petition to the Parliament and the process of CIR. On 
that account, it is important to make clear that the Act acknowledges the 
differences between a citizens-initiated petition under the Act with its own 
statutory consequences and the normal process of parliamentary petition. 115 
Nothing in the Act affects in any way the right of any person to petition the House 
of Representatives or other bodies. 116 
The official leaflet of the Ministry of Justice regarding the CIR process 
subdivides the latter in six different stages: the starting, the question, the signature 
collection, the checking of signatures, the actual referendum and the 
announcement of the results. 117 As the last stage is commonplace, most secondary 
literature describes the process justifiably in five different phases. 118 This five-
stage-model will be outlined in the following. 
A Starting a Referendum 
A referendum petition cannot simply be circulated by a citizen without the 
involvement of Parliament. People wishing to initiate a referendum are 
necessarily involved in a process of vetting and submissions. 119 To start the 
114 See also Appendix II for a diagram of the process. 
115 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 1996, SOs 348-359; Philip A Joseph 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, We11ington, 200 I) 186. 
116 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 59. 
117 Ministry of Justice Pamphlet on the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
<http://www.justice.govt.nzJpubs/other/pamphlets/2001 /citizens referenda.pdf> (last accessed 
22 September 2002). 
118 Joseph, above, 186-7; David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, 
Government Printer, We11ington, 1994) 447-51. 
119 Joseph, above, 186; McGee, above, 44 7. 
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.. 
process, the petitioner, either a natural person or a legal person, has to submit a 
written proposal asking an indicative referendum to be held to the Clerk of the 
House of Representatives. 120 Every referendum petition has to contain the 
suggested wording and shall specify the question that the petitioners propose be 
put to the voters. 121 Furthermore, the proposer has to provide a draft of the petition 
collection form 122 accompanied by payment of the prescribed fee of NZ$ 500. 123 
If satisfied that the proposal complies with the requirements of the Act, the 
Clerk of the House publishes the receipt of the proposal, including the proposed 
wording of the question, in the New Zealand Gazette and in such newspapers that 
he or she considers necessary. 124 This will usually be newspapers circulating in 
the main centres. 125 The publication is meant to ask the public for comments on 
the proposed wording. At least 28 days must be allowed from publication of the 
notice in the Gazette for persons to make comments on the question. 126 
B Determination of Question 
The determination of the referendum question 1s crucial for the whole 
procedure and is probably the most important aspect of the entire Act. 127 The 
practical problems of fixing a suitable question are subject of the following 
chapter. The Act merely states that there can only be one question 128 and this shall 
be such as to convey clearly the purpose and effect of the indicative referendum 
and to ensure that only one of two answers may be given to the question, 129 that is 
to say it allows for only a "yes" or "no" answer. To achieve this aim, the Clerk 
must consult with the proposer and may consult with any other person or 
institution as the Clerk thinks fit. 130 Usually, the Clerk seeks advice from the 
12° Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 6 ( I). 
12 1 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, ss 5 and 6. 
122 Ministry of Justice Pamphlet on the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/other/pamphlets/200 I /citi zens referenda. pdt> (last accessed 
22 September 2002). 
123 Citizens Initiated Referenda Regulations 1993, reg 2. 
124 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 7 (I ). 
125 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, Government Printer, Wellington, 
1994) 448. 
126 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 7 (2) (b). 
127 Caroline Morris "Citizens· Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44. 
128 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 5 (2). 
129 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 10 ( l ) (a), (b). 
13° Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 9. 
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Legislation Advisory Committee and the government departments most closely 
concerned. 131 Furthermore, the Clerk has to take into account the proposal, 
comments received on it and such other matters as he or she considers relevant.
132 
The determination of the final question must be made within three months of 
receipt of the petition, unless it is withdrawn, the proposer dies, a referendum with 
like effect has been held within 60 months preceding the date on which the 
proposal is received or the petition is among the sparse subject-matter restrictions 
of Section 4 of the CIR Act. 133 
Once the precise question has been determined, this must be notified to the 
proposer and published in the usual means. 134 At last, the Clerk must as soon as 
practicable approve a form on which signatures are to be collected to the petition, 
followed once again by notification and publication. 135 This will, although not 
necessary, in practice often be done along with the notice advising of the 
determined question. 136 
C Collecting signatures 
As soon as the petitioner has received notification of both the precise question 
and the approved form, the petitioner may proceed to promote the petition and 
collect signatures. The promoter has twelve months to collect the signatures of ten 
per cent of eligible voters137 (which in 2002 meant 256,779 people). 138 People 
signing the provided forms do not necessarily have to endorse the promoter's 
objectives. It is sufficient if they generally want a referendum on this question to 
be held. 139 According to the Act, the promoter is not allowed to spend more than 
NZ$ 50,000 on advertising the petition or the referendum, respectively. This 
131 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, Government Printer, Wellington, 
1994) 448. 
132 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s I O (2). 
133 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s I I (2). 
134 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 13 (I) (a) (i), (b). 
135 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 13 (1) (a) (ii), (b). 
136 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, Government Printer, Wellington, 
1994) 449. 
137 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 18 (2). 
138 Elections: How to vote - Useful Election Statistics 
<http://www.elections.govt.nzJvotin/mresources-stats.html> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
139 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 186; McGee, above, 449. 
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spending cap is meant to prevent too great a financial influence on the outcome of 
the referendum, which has proved to be a problem overseas. 140 To put this into 
practice, the promoter must make returns of expenditure within one month after 
the referendum results have been published. 141 
Having collected sufficient signatures, the promoter has to deliver the 
complete documents to the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 142 
D Scrutiny of Petition 
It is then the duty of the Clerk of the House to ascertain whether the returned 
petition carries the required number of signatures or not. The Clerk has two 
months from the date of receiving the signatures to fulfill this task. 143 In this 
comparatively short time it is impossible to check all signatures. Therefore, the 
Clerk's office only checks a random sample of pages to assess the validity of 
signatures. 144 The proportion of valid to invalid signatures on the sample is then 
used to calculate the total number of valid signatures to the petition. 145 To be 
valid, all those who are signatories must be on the electoral roll and have signed 
only once. 146 If the required number of electors have signed the signature forms, 
the Clerk delivers the petition to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 147 
The Speaker, in turn, has to present it forthwith to the House. 148 If the returned 
petition was not signed by at least ten percent of the voters, the petition is certified 
as having lapsed and is returned to the promoter. 149 However, the promoter then 
has another two months to gather the missing number of signatures and resubmit 
it to the Clerk who also has another two months to scrutinise the number of valid 
140 Wolf Linder Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (2 ed, 
MacMillan, New York, 1998) 112-4, 144; David B Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on 
Ballot Propositions in the United States (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 147. 
141 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 43 . 
142 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 15 (3). 
143 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 18 (1 ). 
144 Helena Catt "Citizens' lnitiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller New Zealand Government and 
Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 200 I) 386, 387. 
145 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001) 187. 
146 Catt, above, 387. 
147 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 18 (I) (a). 
148 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 21. 
149 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 18 (I) (b ). 
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signatures. 150 If the latter exceeds the required threshold, the petition will be 
passed on the Speaker. Otherwise the referendum petition has finally lapsed.
151 
E Holding a Referendum 
The actual referendum is initiated by the Governor-General who appoints a 
date for the referendum to be held within one month after the certified petition 
was presented to the House. 152 The date so fixed must be within twelve months of 
the presentation to the House. 153 This time can be extended by a 75 percent 
majority resolution of the Members of the House to a maximum of 24 months.
154 
The rules for the holding of the referendum itself correspond by and large to the 
machinery governing elections as many of the provisions of the Electoral Act 
1993 are incorporated into the CIR Act. The Clerk of the Writs has to notify the 
formal result of the referendum in the Gazette and to the Minister of Justice who, 
in tum, informs the House ofRepresentatives. 155 
V PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
The Royal Commission on the Electoral System stated in their report from 
1986 that "referenda can also have significant practical difficulties, which 
diminish their usefulness as a method of deciding important and complex 
questions of law and policy". 156 The following chapter is concerned with an 
examination of some of these practical problems. 
15° Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 20. 
15 1 See Appendix III for details of the five petitions that did not meet the required signature 
threshold. 
152 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 22 (I), (2). 
153 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 22 (3). 
154 Citizens initiated Referenda Act, s 22 (4). 
155 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 40. 
156 Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 175. 
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A The Role of the Clerk of the House 
Caroline Morris observed that "the success or otherwise of Parliament's goal 
of increasing citizens' opportunities for democracy rests heavily on the person 
responsible for the determination" of the referendum question. 157 The person 
responsible for that task under the CIR Act is the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives. 158 The introduction of the CIR Bill was accompanied by a 
contentious debate about whether the Clerk is suitable to perform this task. 
National MP Robert Anderson said during the second reading of the CIR Bill 
regarding the issue of the role of the Clerk that "no doubt we will hear further 
debate on that matter at another time". 159 So far no such debate has been held. 
Does that imply that the determination procedure and the involvement of the 
Clerk proved to work satisfactorily? I argue that that is by no means the case. The 
practice of the subsequent years rather revealed several difficulties resulting from 
the Clerk's engagement with the determination procedure.The following chapter 
outlines the reservations against the Clerk's involvement during the Parliamentary 
debate, notes the problems as laid bare through practice, compares the system 
with that in other countries and analyses alternatives. 
I The role of the Clerk: the legislative debate 
The introduction of CIRs was called for in the National Party's election 
manifesto in 1990. The preceding deliberations of National's Caucus Committee 
concluded with the final recommendation to establish a Commission consisting of 
a High Court Judge and the Clerk of the House to administer the referendum 
petitions. 160 Shortly after National won the election in 1990, the new Minister of 
Justice Douglas Graham provided the Department of Justice with details regarding 
the intended CIR Bill. However, the Department rejected the National Caucus 
157 Caroline Morris "Citizens' Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44; see also Paul 
Harris "Democracy and Referendums" in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and 
Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1992) 61. 
158 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s I I. 
159 Robert Anderson (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17957. 
160 Mark W Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin 
and Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 237,241. 
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Committee's idea regarding the involvement of a High Court Judge in the 
Commission. The Department of Justice took the view that High Court Judges do 
normally not perform advisory and clerical functions and they they had neither the 
facilities nor the time to accomplish that task. 161 The Minister of Justice agreed 
with the Department's recommendations and the originally proposed Commission 
dwindled quietly to only one person, the Clerk of the House. The Clerk, however, 
strongly disapproved his involvement in the CIR process. His disquiet surfaced 
for the first time during the meeting of the Cabinet Legislation Committee on 5 
December 1991, in which the Clerk argued that the House, not the Clerk, should 
determine the wording of referendum questions. 162 As a result of the Clerk's 
objections, the Minister of Justice asked him to present his concerns to the 
Electoral Law Select Committee. 
In the meantime, the CIR Bill was introduced to Parliament. In the first 
reading, the Labour Opposition took up the issue of whether or not the Clerk of 
the House was the most suitable person to determine the wording of referenda 
questions, which "emerged as the most contentious issue of the Bill". 163 Several 
speakers referred to the inevitable politicisation of the Clerk and expressed their 
concern that the Clerk would be somewhat overtaxed by the additional "raft of 
obligations". 164 
In the following Electoral Law Select Committee hearing, the issue was on 
the agenda again. The Clerk had duly filed a submission to the Committee and 
refined his proposal that the responsibility be given to the Speaker of the 
House. 165 During the Select Committee deliberations the Clerk informally 
renewed his opposition and brought up the soon to be created Electoral 
Commission as a further altemative. 166 However, on 19 August 1993, the Select 
Committee rejected the Clerk's concerns. The Committee was confident that the 
Clerk could carry out the responsibility, stating at the same time that no one else 
could be found who was more suitable. 167 The Clerk, anything but satisfied with 
this decision, then lodged a formal request with the National Government to 
161 Gobbi, above, 259. 
162 Gobbi, above, 265. 
163 Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhorn Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation 
of Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auck.land, 1996) 55. 
164 David Lange (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6707; David Caygill (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 
6712; Michael Cullen (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6722. 
165 Gobbi, above, 279. 
166 Gobbi, above, 294. 
167 Gobbi, above, 299. 
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amend the Bill. 168 Somewhat different from his proposals brought forward a few 
weeks before, he requested to give the responsibility to the Electoral Commission, 
not mentioning the Speaker of the House anymore. Despite the following private 
meeting between the Clerk, the Minister of Justice and the Leader of the House to 
discuss the matter, the Clerk was not able to impose his interests and no 
amendments were made. 
The second and third reading of the CIR Bill demonstrated once more the 
significance of this issue. Gobbi observed that it was "the only point of contention 
[that remained] between the National Government and the Labour Opposition". 169 
Again the speakers emphasised the jeopardised neutral position of the Clerk. 170 
Labour MP David Caygill even moved an amendment to shift responsibility to the 
Speaker. However, his amendment failed and the task eventually remained with 
the Clerk. 
2 The duties of the Clerk 
The Clerk is the principal permanent officer of the House and head of 
administration in Parliament. He is appointed by the Governor-General on the 
recommendation of the Speaker of the House. 171 For the last years this task has 
been performed by David McGee. In particular, the Clerk notes all proceedings in 
the House and is responsible for all Parliamentary printing. 172 The Clerk is also 
involved in the legislative process inasmuch as he or she prepares and presents 
copies of Bills, which have been passed by the House to the Governor-General for 
the Royal assent. 173 Statutes and Standing Orders increase the Clerk's purview 
considerably. The Clerk is furthermore the principal officer of the Office of the 
Clerk. The latter is divided in several sub-offices, none of which is first and 
foremost responsible for the performance of the duties resulting from the CIR Act. 
168 Gobbi, above, 301. 
169 Gobbi, above, 304; substantiated by David Caygill (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17965: 
" ... this measure is being adopted with bipartisan support .. . . ". 
17° Caygill, above, 17956, 17964-5; Robert Anderson (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17957; Pete 
Hodgson (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17960. 
171 Clerk of the House of Representatives Act 1988, s 7. 
172 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed, Government Printer, Wellington, 
1994) 43. 
173 McGee, above, 43 . 
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On balance, the Clerk of the House is in charge of the administrative matters in 
Parliament, a traditionally apolitical role. 174 
With the introduction of the CIR Act, the Clerk was instantly confronted with 
a number of new challenges. The Clerk of the House is the institution that every 
person who proposes to promote an indicative referendum has to direct his or her 
petition and the prescribed fee to. 175 The Clerk then enters into preliminary 
negotiations with the promoter to clarify the petition if necessary.
176 The most 
important task is the determination of the precise question. The Clerk, for that 
purpose, consults the proposer, the Legislative Advisory Committee, any other 
person or institution that the Clerk thinks fit and evaluates any received 
submission on the proposal. 177 Although the Clerk may seek advice from other 
institutions, 178 the wording of the question and the negotiations involved often are 
a lengthy and taxing task. 179 The second major task for the Clerk of the House is 
the scrutiny of the petition. The Clerk must, within two months from the date 
receiving a petition, ascertain whether it has been signed by not less than ten 
percent of eligible electors. 180 This task has proved to be extremely labour-
intensive in the "battery-hen" petition case, because the promoter doubted the 
methods of calculation, which led to extensive correspondence with the 
Government Statistician. 181 
3 The process in other countries 
The introductory statement of this paper proclaimed that New Zealand is 
unique, because it adopted a system of non-binding CIRs. However, New Zealand 
is not the only country with initiatives as such. The "paradigmatic cases" 
182 of 
174 McGee, above, 43 ; Caroline Morris "Citizens' Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March 
NZLJ 44, 45. 
me·. I .. dR f, d 1hzens nibate e eren a Act 1993, s 6. 
176 Personal conversation with Carole Hicks, Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
177 McGee, above, 448. 
178 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s 9. 
179 Personal conversation with Carole Hicks, Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
18° Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s 18. 
181 Records of the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives; personal conversation with 
Carole Hicks, Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
182 Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 27. 
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CIRs worldwide are the systems of Switzerland and California, both of which 
were factors in the design of the New Zealand system. 183 Against the background 
of the above outlined New Zealand wording process, it is interesting to examine 
how other states cope with the difficulties of determining referendum questions. 
In Switzerland the initiative must suggest a constitutional amendment. The 
wording of the proposed legislation is provided by the group that initiated the 
process and can take two different forms. An initiative can be formulated either as 
a precise amendment or in general terms and has to be submitted to the Federal 
Assembly. 184 The great majority of initiatives take the specifically-worded form, 
as this goes to the people at once. The Government, however, has the opportunity 
to submit a counterproposal of its own. In the case of an initiative formulated in 
general terms, the Federal Assembly can either agree or reject the general idea. If 
the Parliament agrees, it has to elaborate the question itself, which is then put to a 
popular vote. In case of rejection, the general idea must pass a preliminary 
referendum. If approved by the electorate, the legislature must draft an 
appropriate text and send it to the people again. 185 
In California, it is also the promoting group which has to provide all of the 
details of their new measure using proper legislative language. The proponents, 
however, may obtain assistance from the Legislative Counsel in drafting the 
proposed law. The draft must then be submitted to the Attorney-General. As the 
questions are often very long, with many provisions and clauses, the Attorney-
General prepares a title and summary upon receipt of the request. 186 
Catt states that in these examples a similar process is followed to that in New 
Zealand. 187 However, there are major differences. In New Zealand, it is up to the 
183 Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhorn Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation 
of Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 23. 
184 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation), art 139 (2); Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds) The Referendum 
Experience in Europe (St. Martin · s Press, New York, 1996) 189. 
185 See Kris W Kobach The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland (Dartmouth, 
Brookfield, 1993) 42-3 ; Gallagher and Uleri, above, 189. 
186 Helena Catt "The Other Democratic Experiment: New Zealand 's Experience with Citizens ' 
Initiated Referendum" ( 1996) 48 Political Science 29, 31; California Secretary of State: Ballot 
Initiatives 2001-2002 <http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/init guide O 1-02.pdf> (last accessed 22 
September 2002). 
187 Helena Catt "Citizens · Initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government 
and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2001) 389. 
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Parliament to draft specific legislation, not the proponents. Although the question, 
therefore, covers an issue only broadly and is not written in specific legislative 
language, the Clerk was given the responsibility to determine the wording of the 
question that is eventually put to the voters. This means that the Clerk's purview 
regarding the question wording process is much more extensive than those of the 
Federal Assembly in Switzerland and especially the Attorney-General in 
California. The Clerk therefore holds an unparalleled positition in the CIR 
process. Problems resulting from this significant role will be addressed in .the 
following chapter. 
4 Problems and alternatives 
The difficulties resulting from the Clerk's involvement in the CIR process 
can be divided into those concerning the above mentioned fear of politicisation of 
the Clerk and those relating to the performance of the task as such. Into the 
bargain, the problem of the additional workload due to the number of new 
obligations cast on the Clerk must not be underestimated either.
188 
The neutrality of referendum questions m a democracy is essential. The 
wording must therefore be carried out by a neutral institution. The Clerk of the 
House is traditionally such a politically neutral body.
189 At the same time, 
however, the promoters of referendum petitions undoubtedly pursue political, i.e. 
interest-orientated, aims. 190 The wording process is consequently a political one 
and the person or body responsible carries an immanent suspicion of bias. While 
every institution concerned with the determination of a referendum question is 
naturally subject to these reservations, the politicisation of the Clerk of the House, 
a Parliamentary institution at the heart of democracy, is certainly alarming. 
188 See David Lange (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6707; the files of the Office of the Clerk reveal 
the large amount of correspondence, especially regarding the check of signatures; see for an 
example Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhom Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the 
Operation of Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1996) 70. 
189 Caroline Morris "Citizens' Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44, 45; Laxton-
Blinkhom, above, 55 
190 Pete Hodgson ( 14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17960: "the wording of the question is an 
intensely political act", "neutral but political job"; Hodgsons opinion that the job should be done 
by a neutral but political person is, however, a contradiction in itself and therefore not 
comprehensible. A person or institution can be either political or neutral. 
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During the introductory debate of the CIR Bill, the awareness of this dilemma was 
ubiquitous. Labour MP Michael Cullen regarded the politicisation of the Clerk as 
a ''very dangerous process in terms of the standing of Parliament". 191 As was 
shown above, this problem does not exist to that extent in Switzerland and 
California, where the proponents formulate the questions themselves, which 
means that no institution is exposed to any suspicion of bias. However, during the 
almost ten years of CIR experience the Clerk was never accused of being 
politically biased nor has the Office of the Clerk outwardly lost any of its 
politically neutral reputation. This must, on the other hand, not obscure the fact 
that the political involvement of the otherwise neutral Clerk has latent overtones 
of bias. 
The second source of difficulties with regard to the Clerk of the House is the 
sparse criteria that the CIR Act provides for the institution determining the 
question. The CIR Act gives exactly three instructions. Section 5 (2) says that, 
first, the referendum must not relate to more than one question. Sections 10 (1) (a) 
and (b) provide that, secondly, the question has to convey clearly the purpose and 
effect of the referendum and, thirdly, must be such as to ensure that only one of 
two answers can be given. Another unwritten but undisputed criterion is that the 
wording must enable the referendum result to provide meaningful guidance to 
Government and Parliament. 192 Two petitions shall be quoted to demonstrate the 
inherent problems of this limited guidance. 
The very first question as determined by the Clerk read "should the 
production of eggs from battery hens be prohibited within five years of the 
referendum?". The Clerk· s determination omitted the promoters' inclusion of the 
phrase "inhumane practice of battery hen production". Nevertheless, the Egg 
Producers Federation of New Zealand as the affected organisation sought judicial 
review of the Clerk's decision, because it took the view that the Clerk still gave 
excessive weight to irrelevant factors, insufficient weight to relevant ones and 
indeed misinterpreted the Act. Although the High Court eventually decided in the 
Clerk's favour, 193 the inner conflict between neutrality, limited guidance and the 
191 Michael Cullen (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6722. 
192 See in Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives (20 June J 994) 
High Court Wellington CP 128/94 Eichelbaum CJ, 4. 
193 Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives, above. 
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need for corrections of problematical questions became obvious. Caroline Morris 
got to the heart of the dilemma when she queried how an institution is supposed to 
tread the fine line between refining the question to make it more easily 
understandable and being seen to be influencing the wording?
194 
Another problem became obvious in the referendum to reform the criminal 
justice system. 195 The question comprised in actuality several different ones. How 
did people vote if they supported one part but not the other parts? The problem of 
the question itself, which Church called the "most disquieting aspect of the 
referendum", 196 is subject of the following chapter, but this referendum also 
revealed the dilemma of the Clerk. Although the Clerk knew that initiatives must 
ask only one question and admit only one of two possible answers, he was not 
able to prevent the question from surviving in its final form. This was because the 
Clerk is not "required or indeed permitted to turn the proposal into something it 
does not purport to be". 1
97 This clearly refutes Parkinson' s assertion that "the 
Clerk of the House has the final say", 
198 which is by no means the case. The Clerk 
can only influence the wording within limits. The promoter, however, has always 
the final say. This illustrates vividly that the Clerk has little power to translate the 
already sparse criteria of the CIR Act into practice. 
No lessons can be learned from the overseas experience in Switzerland and 
California, as the process with petitioners formulating initiatives in proper 
legislative language is too different from the New Zealand system to draw any 
beneficial conclusions. However, in the face of the above described difficulties, 
alterations that take all of these problems into account seem to be appropriate. 
Surprisingly, the Clerk was chosen to perform the CIR task despite his persistent 
194 Caroline Morris "Citizens· Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44, 46. 
195 "Should there be a reform of our justice system placing greater emphasis on the needs of the 
victims, providing restitution and compensation for them and imposing minimum sentences and 
hard labour for all serious violent offences?". 
I% Stephen Church Crime and Punishment: The Referenda to Reform the Criminal Justice System 
and Reduce the Size of Parliament in Jonathan Boston and others (eds) Left turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 194. 
197 Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives (20 June 1994) High 
Court Wellington CP 128/94 Eicbelbaum CJ; Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) 188; in addition, Parkinson speculates 
that "the Clerk simply gave up fighting with a distrustful proponent": see John Parkinson Who 
Knows Best: the Creation of the Citizens-Initiated Referendum in New Zealand 
<http://socpol.anu.edu.au/- parkinson/nzcir.pdf.> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
198 Parkinson, above. 
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opposition. The reason for this was that no alternative solution could be found. 199 
In the relevant literature, several institutions have been suggested to perform this 
task. The Speaker and the Electoral Commission also bear the suspicion of bias.200 
High Court Judges were also omitted due to their independent position and their 
lack of the required facilities.201 
However, as long as the person m charge has no appropriate legislative 
guidance as to how to perform the task and, moreover, no power to protect the 
provisions of the CIR Act, the search of alternative institutions proves futile.202 
The revision of the Act should therefore be the first thing to do. Subsequently, the 
search for alternatives can be pursued in two directions. If one prefers the task to 
remain in Parliament, 203 a special Committee, consisting of experts of all parties, 
could be established. This was envisaged in the Popular Initiatives Bill from 
1983,204 a proposal that has unfortunately never been taken up again. A second 
opportunity would be to commission an external agency as an "independent third 
party", 205 which has both the necessary resources and the expert knowledge to 
cope with the task.206 Into the bargain, it also seems to be sensible to split up the 
determination of the question and the evaluation of the signatures and allocate 
them to different appropriate institutions. 
199 Mark W Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the Origin 
and Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 268, 299. 
200 Caroline Morris "Citizens· Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44, 46. 
201 Gobbi, above, 259. 
202 See Morris, above, 46 : " it does not remove the difficulties caused by the limited legislative 
guidance" . 
203 As preferred by the Select Committee on August 17th, 1993, see Gobbi, above, 295 . 
204 Gobbi, above, 206-7; the establishment of a Commission was also called for in the National 
Party · s election manifesto, although this was supposed to consist of the Clerk and a High Court 
Judge only; the idea of a Commission or a Committee, respectively, quietly died when the 
Department of Justice ruled out the High Court Judge: see Gobbi, above, 259. 
205 Morris, above, 46. 
206 Several submissions filed to the Select Committee during the legislative process of the CIR Bill 
suggested to commission a quango (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation): see 
Gobbi , above, 288; see for another interesting approach also Janet McLean "Making More (or 
Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-initiated Referenda" in Colin James (ed) Building the 
Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 367: "Closer supervision of the 
question ( ... perhaps, by the Attorney-General, or the Chair of the Electoral Commission) may 
do something to enhance the quality of the process."; see also Brent Edwards "Referendum Law 
Up for Review" (4 December 1995) The Evening Post Wellington I: "The chairman of the 
Electoral Committee, National MP Tony Ryall . .. said the law needed changing. Options could 
include an independent commissioner or committee to decide whether questions were suitable 
for a referendum.". 
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5 Conclusion 
During the second reading of the CIR Bill Pete Hodgson held the view that 
the wording of the question "requires the wisdom of Solomon, [ and] it requires 
overt neutrality".207 The obligation to frame the question as neutrally as possible 
within the parameters of the original proposals is indeed an immensely difficult 
task. However, the instruments the Clerk was provided with to perform this task 
are less than sufficient. The CIR Act does not live up to the expectations 
expressed before the introduction of the Act that a "satisfactory procedure for 
setting and vetting the referendum questions" be essential.208 In the face of this, it 
may be appropriate time to tackle these difficulties. 
B The Referendum Question 
In theory there is no doubt that referendum questions have to be simple, clear 
and unambiguous. 209 As was previously shown, precise guidance for the 
institution in charge of determining the question is crucial. And yet the question 
remains if in practice it is possible to couch a proposition that meets the above 
mentioned theoretical requirements. The following chapter examines problems 
that are causally related with the referendum question, such as difficulties 
resulting from the question itself, ramifications for the Government and 
consequences for the voters. 
1 Only one of two answers 
According to Section 10 (1) (b) of the CIR Act only one of two answers, yes 
or no, may be given to the question. The appropriateness of this twofold choice is 
207 Pete Hodgson (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17960. 
208 J H Wallace "Commentary on 'Referendums: Legal and Constitutional Aspects' " in Alan 
Simpson (ed) Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1992) 30. 
209 Justice and Electoral Committee Inquiry into the 1999 General Election (2001) AJHR I.7C; 
Venice Commission Guidelines for Constitutional Referendums at National level 
<http://venice.coe.int/docs/200 l/CDL-TNF(200 I )0 I 0-e.html> (last accessed 22 September 
2002). 
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undoubted, as everything else would mostly be impracticable.210 Reading relevant 
literature, one can detect that a large number of problems arising from referendum 
questions are more or less distinctly connected with the requirement to answer yes 
orno. 
(a) YesorNo? 
When an initiative proposition is very complex, the voters may not be sure if 
it is a yes or a no vote that corresponds with their view.211 In principle it can be 
said that a yes vote supports the petition of the promoter. If the voters are 
confused about whether they are voting to repeal or to enact something, a no vote 
is therefore mostly the safest option to maintain the status quo.212 Consequently, 
surveys divulge that the more difficult it is to comprehend a proposition, the more 
often voters will vote no.213 However, it is easy to imagine that additional 
confusion can occur when the promoters do not ask for a yes vote but rather hope 
for a no vote. Such was the case in the firefighters referendum in 1995, when the 
Professional Firefighters Union asked whether the number of firefighters should 
be reduced and sought a negative answer. 214 
210 Helena Catt, Paul Harris and Nigel S Roberts Voter ·s Choice: Electoral Change in New 
Zealand? (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, NZ, 1992) 134; Venice Commission Guidelines 
for Constitutional Referendums at National Level <http://venice.coe.intdocs/200J /CDL-
INF(2001)010-e.html> (last accessed 22 September 2002); see for some exceptions of the 
twofold choice Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) 73; New 
Zealand experienced a multiple choice referendum on 19 September 1992, when the voters were 
asked which of four different voting systems they preferred; furthermore, the national liquor 
licensing polls asked the voters to decide between "national continuance", "state control" or 
"national prohibition". 
211 In California a survey on a certain ballot proposition revealed that 18 percent of the voters did 
not know what a yes vote meant: see David B Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot 
Propositions in the United States (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 143; see 
also Bob Edlin "A grand exercise in ballot-box absurdity" (8 December 1995) The Independent 
Wellington 10: "Far too many people who might have voted, had they been better enlightened, 
seem to have stayed away simply because they did not know what they would be endorsing if 
they answered ' yes · or ' no· on the ballot paper" (relating to the "firefighters" petition). 
212 An advertisement ran in a Salt Lake City campaign saying simply: "Confused? Many are. Play 
it safe - When in Doubt, Vote No!": see Magleby, above, 142. 
213 Jeffrey A Dubin and Gretchen A Kalsow "Participation in Direct Legislation: Evidence from 
the Voting Booth" (1997) 997 California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 
10, 13-4; Catt, above, 71. 
214 Helena Catt "The Other Democratic Experiment: New Zealand·s Experience with Citizens · 
Initiated Referendum" ( 1996) 48 Political Science 29, 36; however, 87.8 percent voted no and 
there is no evidence of whether voters may have been confused by the reversed question; 
Professional Fire Fighters Union Cartoon (30 November 1995) New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
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PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS UNION 
, 'Yes'?! NO! 
(b) Questions that anticipate their answer 
Another problem of referendum questions is that they are often couched in a 
way that anticipates an answer.215 Voters then feel compelled by the formulation 
of the question to answer yes or at least find it hard to say no (for example 
"Should there be less crime on the streets?"). The same issue can be formulated so 
differently that both questions, although exactly opposite, would almost certainly 
produce an overwhelming answer in the opposite direction. These reservations 
have been expressed during the introduction debate of the CIR Bill by consulting 
the issue of abortion. The contradicting propositions "Are you in favour of giving 
statutory protection to the right to life of the unborn child?" and "Do you think 
women should have control over their own bodies?" would both almost certainly 
result in a distinct affirmative answer.216 This demonstrates vividly to what extent 
the formulation of the question can influence the outcome. The previous CIR 
experience confirmed these reservations. In the case of the "battery hens" petition, 
the Clerk of the House was accused of having incorporated emotive and question-
2 15 The literature uses a large number of expressions to describe this problem; see for examples 
Janet McLean "Making More (or Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-Initiated Referenda" 
in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 366: 
"leading questions"; Gabriela Wehrle "The Firefighters· Referendum - Should Questions 
Arising from Industrial Disputes be Excluded from Referenda Held under the Citizens Initiated 
Referenda Act 1993?" (1997) 27 VUWLR 273, 288: "emotive"; Helena Catt, Paul Harris and 
Nigel S Roberts Voter's Choice: Electoral Change in New Zealand? (Dunmore Press, 
Palmerston North, NZ, 1992) 139: "contentious"; Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhom Half Hearted 
Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation of Citizens Initiated Referenda in Nf!W 
Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 87: "biased". 
2 16 Michael Cullen (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6722; see also Jonathan Hunt (10 March 1992) 
522 NZPD 6715-6; Catt, Harris and Roberts, above, 139. 
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begging language in referring to "battery hens".217 Although the Court rejected 
this view, the Judge "readily accept[ ed] that a question framed in emotive or 
prejudicial terms is unlikely to fulfil the section 10 requirement of clarity".218 
However, this did not exclude answer-anticipating questions from the agenda in 
the following. Doug Graham, the then Minister of Justice, said that Next Step's 
questions on health and education inherently biased the results. The proposition 
"Should all New Zealanders have access to comprehensive health services which 
are fully government funded and without user charges?" would certainly have 
provoked a different result than if the promoters had proposed a tax increase to 
finance the health services.219 Another example was the "firefighters" petition, 
when the promoters asked if the number of firefighters should be reduced, which 
the overwhelming majority of voters disapproved. The Government took the view 
that "the public has been taken in by a rather large dose of emotional clap trap".220 
The Clerk, as was previously described, lacks the power to prevent these 
questions from being raised, as the promoter has the final say. However, even if 
the Clerk had this power, the problem of loaded questions seems to be inherent to 
all referendum petitions. 
( c) Two or more issues in one question 
Section 5 (2) of the CIR Act unambiguously stipulates that referendum 
petitions may not relate to more than one question. However, the "criminal 
justice" petition revealed that "it is not self-evident that the question met even 
2 17 The Clerk had already turned down the originally proposed word "inhumane" (battery egg 
production) as this would otherwise"comprornise the integrity of a referendum" being "emotive 
and prejudic[ing] a fair assessment of the merits of the question proposed": see Note in the files 
of the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
218 Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives (20 June 1994) High 
Court Wellington CP 128/94 Eichelbaum CJ . 
219 Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhom Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation 
of Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 87. 
zzo Letter from the Minister of Internal Affairs to AV Hunter, 26 May 1995: cited in Gabriela 
Wehrle "The Firefighters' Referendum - Should Questions Arising from Industrial Disputes be 
Excluded from Referenda Held under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993?" (1997) 27 
VUWLR 273,288; see also "Referendum a $!Orn Nonsense" (4 December 1995) The Dominion 
Wellington 8: "It can only be speculated what the result might have been if the public had been 
asked: "Should the New Zealand Fire Service be as efficient and effective as possible?' or 'Do 
you favour reorganising the Fire Service to make firefighters more productive?'". 
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the[se] sparse statutory criteria".22 1 The question rather comprised at least three 
different issues, to which the voters had to give only one yes or no answer. Voters 
were caught in the dilemma of how to respond if they agreed to emphasise the 
needs of the victims on the one hand, but disapproved the imposition of longer 
sentences or hard labour on the other hand. Church put it in a nutshell: "Even if 
voters found it difficult to agree with all aspects of the question, it was equally 
difficult to disagree with every aspect".222 
In general, one can observe that referendum proposals are prone to confusing 
two or more issues, 223 which leads to bewildered and nonplussed voters who are 
faced with the problem that they have to vote yes or no on the whole proposition. 
( d) Simple and simplistic 
Framing the question m a way that allows only one of two answers 
theoretically rules out the consideration of complex issues.224 Referendums are 
simplistic devices, which are not capable of dealing with intricate policies if they 
want to remain comprehensible. 225 As an example, many regarded the 
"firefighters" dispute as too complex to be put to the voters.226 
221 Janet McLean "Making More (or Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-Initiated Referenda" 
in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 366; 
"Criminal justice" petition: "Should there be reform of our justice system placing greater 
emphasis on the needs of victims, providing restitution and compensation for them and imposing 
minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious violent offences"; see for details Appendix 
III . 
222 Stephen Church Crime and Punishment: The Referenda to Reform the Criminal Justice System 
and Reduce the Size of Parliament in Jonathan Boston and others (eds) Left turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 194; see also 
"Acting on Referendums" (30 November 1999) The Press Christchurch 4; John Parkinson Who 
Knows Best: the Creation of the Citizens-Initiated Referendum in New Zealand 
<http://socpol.anu.edu.au/- parkinson/nzcir.pd t> (last accessed 22 September 2002); Craig 
Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Ref erenda in New Zealand (MPP Research 
Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 24; Caroline Morris "Citizens · Referenda: Time 
to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44, 45 . 
223 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed., Brookers, 
Wellington, 200 I) I 88. 
224 Michael Cullen (I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6721 . 
225 See Joseph, above, 188; Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand 
Government under MMP (3 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 202 ; John Collinge 
"Keeping a Watch on Democracy by Use of Public Referendums" in Alan Simpson (ed) 
Referendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 
1992) 79, 83 ; "Dialogue: No Powerto the People in Citizens ' Referendums" (15 February 2001 ) 
New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
226 "Referendum a $1 Orn Nonsense" (4 December 1995) The Dominion Wellington 8; Alison 
Tocker "Low Poll Turnout Sparks Rethink of Referendum Rules" (4 December 1995) The 
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However, in practice this rarely leads to the exclusion of complicated matters 
but rather to the attempt to simplify the question. This is an undertaking that often 
fails. Trying to take all different aspects of the issue into consideration, some 
questions are extremely long-winded.227 Other questions contain vague and 
unclear words, making them difficult to understand and leading to confusion 
among the voters. The very first CIR petition, for example, caused a contentious 
debate about what "battery egg production" means.228 The "criminal justice" 
petition generated a number of indefinite terms, such as "serious violent offences" 
or "hard labour".229 Another question asked if Members of Parliament should be 
elected by "single transferable vote (STV)" with "constituency-based multi-
member electorates". 
Thirdly, often complex issues can not be compressed into black and white 
answers. There are often variations, options and conciliatory opinions that a 
simple yes or no question does not reflect appropriately.230 Whereas voters have 
to make clear-cut decisions one way or the other, part of the role of parliament in 
contrast is to debate issues, to look at how one issue impacts on others and resolve 
matters by compromise. 231 Referendum decisions, therefore, lack the quality of 
parliamentary deliberation. 232 
Dominion Wellington I; Brent Edwards "Referendum Law Up for Review" (4 December 1995) 
The Evening Post Wellington I ; Bob Edlin "A grand exercise in ballot-box absurdity" (8 
December 1995) The Independent Wellington JO; D A M Graham, Minister of Justice (4 
December 1995) Radio New Zealand Interview (Good Morning New Zealand); the Egg 
Producers Federation also argued in the "battery hens" petition that the issue was too complex to 
be reduced to a simple yes/no answer: see Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhom Half Hearted Democracy: 
A Critical Examination of the Operation of Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 69. 
227 For example: ,,Should New Zealand adopt direct democracy by binding referendum whereby 
ideas for laws would be submitted and voted upon as of right by the public and, according to the 
result, submissions collected from the public and then assessed by opinion poll, resulting in draft 
law alternatives being prepared by independent groups, from which one opinion would be 
chosen by majority vote by the public; the resulting legislation to be binding?". 
228 Note in the files of the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives: " .. . it is not a term 
of art. There are legitimate differences in interpretation of what it might mean". 
229 See Caroline Morris "Citizens ' Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44, 45; John 
Parkinson Who Knows Best: the Creation of the Citizens-Initiated Ref erendum in New Zealand 
<http://socpol.anu.edu.au/-parkinson/nzcir.pdf> (last accessed 22 September 2002). 
230 Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 175; Geoffrey 
Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (3 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1997) 202. 
231 Helena Catt "Citizens' Initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government 
and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 200 I) 391 ; Philip A Joseph Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 200 I) 188; Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System, above, 175; Into the bargain, "meanwhile in all democratic countries 
specialists proliferated in the ministries, departments, and other executive and administrative 
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2 The government response or "What's that you say ... ?" 
The long title of the CIR Act stipulates that CIRs under the Act are only 
indicative, thus not binding on the Government. However, it is believed that if the 
people appear to speak with a loud and united voice, the Government will find the 
result hard to overlook.233 Three referendums have been held so far, but the 
Government did not react noticeably.234 This lack of response can certainly lead to 
frustration among the voters.235 
In the context of referendum questions, however, another problem becomes 
apparent. Some questions create problems for the Government in deciding how it 
should respond to the outcome of the referendum. Regarding multiple questions, 
such as the "criminal justice" petition, it is difficult for the Government, if it was 
inclined to react, to determine which part or parts of the question won the support 
of voters.236 Does a yes vote signal agreement with the entire proposition or only 
with certain parts?237 Furthermore, MPs will find it difficult to know which action 
to take if voters deliver a mixed mandate, i.e. if their party policy and the 
referendum result contradict.238 
organisations": Robert A Dahl Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1989) 336. 
232 Wolf Linder Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (2 ed, 
MacMillan, New York, 1998) 111. 
233 Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (2 ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1997) 
285. 
234 See Gabriela Wehrle "The Firefighters ' Referendum - Should Questions Arising from 
Industrial Disputes be Excluded from Referenda Held under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 
1993?" (I 997) 27 VUWLR 273, 290: "It is not clear whether the result has actually had any 
impact" (relating to the " firefighters" referendum). 
235 See for details Caroline Morris "Citizens ' Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 
44, 46. 
236 Stephen Church Crime and Punishment: The Ref erenda to Reform the Criminal Justice System 
and Reduce the Size of Parliament in Jonathan Boston and others (eds) Left turn: The New 
Zealand General Election of 1999 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 194, 
237 Morris, above, 45 . 
238 See Helena Catt "Citizens ' Initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 200 I) 391 : "If in 1996 there had 
been a vote suggesting that ' there be a fully-funded tertiary education system, with no user 
charges ', opinion polls suggest if would have passed. However, in 1996 voters also elected a 
National-led government whose policy was explicitly opposed to fully-funded tertiary 
education."; problems resulting from the fact that the Government is indeed not able to respond 
on the proposal will be addressed in the chapter on subject-matter restrictions. 
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3 The measurement of effects on voters 
The impact of referendum questions on voters 1s difficult to determine. 
Surveys regarding the voter feelings, such as apathy or confusion, have not been 
conducted in New Zealand. However, the effects on voters can be measured by 
looking at turnout levels and by examining the CIR propositions regarding their 
understandability. 
(a) Voter turnout 
All three CIRs that have been held so far showed overwhelming support in 
favour of the promoter's petition.239 However, the voter turnout is also very 
important, as a low turnout means a decision by only a small proportion of the 
population. Experience shows that referendums held alongside general elections 
will result in a significantly higher turnout.24° Consequently, the "Members of 
Parliament" petition and the "criminal justice" petition, both held alongside the 
1999 general election, attracted a high turnout of almost 83 percent. On the other 
hand, the "firefighters" petition drew only 28 percent of the total registered 
electors to the voting booth, the lowest turnout ever recorded for a referendum.241 
It is easily imaginable that there is a connection between the low voter turnout and 
a lack of interest among the voters. According to surveys, a connection is also 
discernible between a low turnout and the understandability of the proposition or, 
vice versa, the higher the voter's knowledge, the greater is the probability that he 
or she will vote.242 This corresponds with the above made ascertainment that the 
239 "Firefighters" petition: 88 % no (no vote intended by the promoter); "Members of Parliament" 
petition: 81.5 % yes; "Criminal justice" petition: 91. 7 % yes; see also Appendix III. 
24° Catt, above, 393; the seven government-initiated special polls in New Zealand attracted an 
average turnout of 61.9 %, whereas the two government-initiated referendums that have been 
held alongside general elections resulted in an average turnout of 83.8 % (see Appendix I). 
241 Gabriela Wehrle "The Firefighters ' Referendum - Should Questions Arising from Industrial 
Disputes be Excluded from Referenda Held under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993?" 
(1997) 27 VUWLR 273, 289; see also Appendix V for a comparison of the turnout in general 
elections and in special polls in New Zealand and other countries. 
242 Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds) The Referendum Experience in Europe (St. 
Martin 's Press, New York, 1996) 201; Jeffrey A Dubin and Gretchen A Kalsow "Participation 
in Direct Legislation: Evidence from the Voting Booth" (1997) 997 California Institute of 
Technology Social Science Working Paper 12-3. 
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"firefighters" dispute was very complex, however, there 1s no evidence for a 
connection between the complexity and the low turnout. 
In terms of a low turnout, the decision to implement only indicative 
referendums appears to be sensible. If the referendum was binding, the question 
would clearly arise if the Government should be bound by a referendum result 
with a turnout of a meagre 28 percent. 243 Furthermore, as referendums are a 
majoritarian instrument, it is conceivable that initiatives are used against 
minorities.244 On the other hand, it is also possible that a minority, taken the low 
voter turnout, imposes measures against a largely apathetic majority.245 
A means to prevent a low turnout is to hold CIR referendums always 
alongside general elections.246 However, critics express the concern that 
referendums at elections entangle the referendum issue and the major election 
issue and voters might get somewhat confused.247 Other alternatives would be to 
make increasing use of postal votes248, phone polling249 or the intemet.250 
(b) Comprehension 
Determining the extent of the voter 's knowledge about the propositions they 
are deciding on is essential to an evaluation of the quality of mass participation in 
direct legislation. Within the context of the debate about direct democracy, 
scholars, supported by empirical studies, have often argued that policy choices 
243 Catt, above, 393: "In Italy, votes are only binding if over half of the people vote, but this is not 
the rule in either the United States or Switzerland". 
244 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System: Towards a Better Democracy (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) 175; Catt, above, 
393. 
245 See Jack H Nagel Participation (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987) 92. 
246 Catt, above, 393: "In the United States a referendum vote must coincide with an election, but in 
Italy and Switzerland the two types of votes must be separate". 
247 
Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above, 175; Justice and Electoral Committee 
inquiry into the 1999 General Election (2001) AJHR 1.7 C 54-5. 
248 
Referenda (Postal Voting) Act 2000, s 5 (b); the government-initiated referendum on the 
introduction of compulsory superannuation savings from 5-26 September 1997 was a postal 
ballot and reached a turnout of 80.34%. 
249 Bonnie Laxton-Blinkhom Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation 
of Citizens initiated Ref erenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 86; 
Jane Clifton "Referenda by phone" ( I 8 August 1996) Sunday Star Times Auckland I 0. 
25° Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) I 0-1. 
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have become too complex for most people to understand.251 Inequality in civic 
competence is a serious problem of democracy, particularly in its direct form. The 
capability of voters depends mainly on two factors: the level of education and the 
complexity of the text submitted to the vote.252 In general, it has been observed 
that referendums as a means of direct democracy favour more educated 
citizens.253 
A means to prove this ascertainment is to apply readability formulas on ballot 
propositions in order to assess their understandability. Readability formulas 
calculate the probable difficulty of any text by measuring the variables of 
vocabulary, sentence length, complexity and conceptual difficulty. Two standard 
readability formulas, the FOG Index and the Flesch Reading Ease Formula, have 
been applied to the CIR petitions in New Zealand to ascertain their 
comprehensibility.254 The result, being naturally only a rough statistical 
approximation, clearly revealed the complexity of the CIR propositions. 
According to the FOG Index, the petitions have an average complexity degree of 
17.4, indicating the number of years of education the reader needs to understand 
the text. The Flesch Reading Ease Formula resulted in a complexity degree of 
27 .12, with 100 being extremely easy and zero being extremely difficult. A score 
of 65 stands for plain English.255 If the readability score is a proxy for the voter 's 
ability to comprehend the proposition,256 these results divulge that the above 
statement is correct. Referendums patently handicap Jess educated people. If 
voters do not understand propositions, they are likely to either give an uninformed 
vote or "drop off' completely, which, in turn, can result in skewed results or a low 
turnout, respectively.257 
25 1 See Robert A Dahl Democracy and its Critics (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989) 337-
40; Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) I 4 with further evidence. 
252 Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uteri (eds) The Referendum Experience in Europe (St. 
Martin 's Press, New York. 1996) 198. 
253 Press, above, 29; David B Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the 
United States (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 14 I ; Catt, above, 70. 
254 See for details Appendix IV . 
255 Readability formulas have already been applied to ballot propositions in some US states, 
showing a very similar t'esult with a Flesch Reading Ease score of between 24.5 and 32.9: see 
Magleby, above, 119. 
256 Jeffrey A Dubin and Gretchen A Kalsow "Participation in Direct Legislation: Evidence from 
the Voting Booth" (1997) 997 California lnstitute of Technology Social Science Working Paper 
9. 
257 Magleby, above, 111-9; Dubin and Kalsow, above, 14; Wolf Linder Swiss Democracy: 
Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies (2 ed, MacMillan, New York, 1998) 95, 
111-2. 
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4 Information 
The complexity of referendum questions and the information policy 
governments are closely connected. The more complex and difficult propositions 
are, the more important is the public voter education. 
Most countries that hold referendums provide basic information for the voters 
during the campaign period. A book.let, detailing each initiative, plus a short 
statement from each side, is sent to all voters in American states. In Switzerland, a 
Government-produced pamphlet is provided and each side is given free television 
time.258 Despite these attempts to inform the voters, surveys demonstrate that only 
a minority of people actually reads this information, let alone understands it.
259 
Consequently, voting studies in other countries have documented that people 's 
knowledge about major public issues at stake was low even after an intensive 
campaign.260 
Unlike American states and Switzerland, there is no statutory provision in the 
CIR Act, requiring the New Zealand Government to distribute some sort of 
information to the voters.
26 1 Justifiably, Wehrle considers this a flaw in the 
legislation. Despite the lack of a statutory obligation, some attempts have been 
made to provide information regarding the three referendums that have been held 
so far. However, these attempts proved to be half-hearted and insufficient. 
Although the Cabinet agreed that a pre-referendum pamphlet regarding the 
"firefighters" petition would be distributed to each household, nothing of that kind 
happened, because the parties could not agree on the information to be 
provided.262 Prior to the 1999 referendums, the Chief Electoral Officer learned 
258 Helena Catt "The Other Democratic Experiment: New Zealand 's Experience with Citizens ' 
Initiated Referendum" ( 1996) 48 Political Science 29, 32; Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo 
Uleri (eds) The Referendum Experience in Europe (St. Martin 's Press, New York, 1996) 198. 
259 Gallagher and uteri, above, I 98; Dubin and Kalsow, above, 10. 
260 Magleby, above, 127; Linder, above, 111. 
26 1 Despite the strong request from both scholars and the public before the introduction of the CIR 
Act to implement appropriate arrangements concerning the provision of accurate information: 
see J H Wallace "Commentary on 'Referendums: Legal and Constitutional Aspects' " in Alan 
Simpson (ed) Ref erendums: Constitutional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University 
Press, Wellington, 1992) 30; Mark W Gobbi The Quest for Legitimacy: a Comparative 
Constitutional Study of the Origin and Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, 
and New Zealand (LLM Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, I 994) 280: " .. . three 
submissions [to the Select Committee] suggested that the CIR Bill should contain provisions 
requiring the Government to supply .. . balanced information. 
262 Gabriela Wehrle "The Firefighters ' Referendum - Should Questions Arising from Industrial 
Disputes be Excluded from Referenda Held under the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993?" 
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from the Crown Law Office that it cannot undertake public education on 
referendum questions, unless the referendum relates to an electoral matter.263 This 
applied only to the "Members of Parliament" petition. Consequently, the Chief 
Electoral Office only produced a brochure regarding the "Members of Parliament" 
petition and no official information was available to voters about the CIR on 
"criminal justice". Moreover, due to the limited funding of the Office, the 
brochure was only distributed to those people who made inquiries about the 
referendum. 264 
In the face of this, Catt is certainly right when she implies that the voters were 
not sufficiently informed on the three CIRs.265 The implementation of provisions 
requiring appropriate arrangements as to who is in charge and what kind of 
information has to be supplied in which way is therefore essential. 
C Subject-matter Restrictions 
The CIR Act excludes issues that have been subject of a referendum held 
within five years prior to the receipt of the petition266 and propositions that call for 
an inquiry into the way a previous referendum was conducted. 267 Apart from that, 
virtually any ·issue can be subject of CIRs in New Zealand. In the judicial scrutiny 
of the "battery hens" petition, the High Court thought this extraordinary.268 
However, it can be argued that even these sparse restrictions have not been 
observed, as three of the 34 petitions filed so far asked for the reduction of the 
number ofMPs.269 
During the CIR introduction debate, the Government clarified that it wanted 
the public to be able to voice its opinion on any topic.270 However, subliminally 
(1997) 27 VUWLR 273, 287; Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated 
Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 22. 
263 Justice and Electoral Committee Inquiry into the 1999 General Election (200 I) AJHR £.7C 55. 
264 Justice and Electoral Committee, above, 55. 
265 Helena Catt "Citizens ' Initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand Government 
and Politics (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 200 I) 391. 
266 Citizens lnitiated Referenda Act 1993, s 11 (2) (b ). 
267 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s 4. 
268 Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives (20 June 1994) High 
Court Wellington CP 128/94 Eichelbaum CJ 6. 
269 See Appendix III; see regarding repetitive questions in detail Caroline Morris "Citizens · 
Referenda: Time to Review?" (2002) March NZLJ 44, 46. 
270 DAM Graham (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17952. 
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there was the hope that only "sensible" and "suitable" questions on big moral or 
social issues such as capital punishment, euthanasia and homosexual law reform 
would be filed to the Clerk.271 It was suggested that the 10 percent threshold, the 
cost factor and not least common sense and maturity of the voters would prevent 
irrational and unsuitable questions from being raised.272 This appraisal proved to 
be wrong. By many and especially the Government, the "firefighters" issue was 
regarded as an industrial dispute, not appropriate to be decided on in a 
referendum.273 In the public debate arising from this, politicians and media called 
the referendum questions that had been filed until then inadequate, "a bit loopy", 
"motherhood and apple pie" or just generally unsuitable.274 Furthermore, the High 
Court readily supposed that vexatious, defamatory, indecent or scandalous 
questions might appear on the referendum agenda.275 It seems that this problem is 
initiative-inherent, as it is largely impossible to define which types of issues are 
unsuitable and then exclude them beforehand.276 The implementation of a general 
statutory subject-matter restriction, however, seems to be possible for three fields 
that can clearly be defined. 
First, referendum petitions that contravene the constitution, e.g. violations of 
the Human Rights Act 1993, must not be put to the voters. Against that, the 
argument runs that New Zealand does not have a single-document Constitution 
and the courts do not have the power to render referendum results null and 
void.277 Yet, New Zealand has a constitution and if the Parliament implements a 
271 Bonnie Laxton-Blink.horn Half Hearted Democracy: A Critical Examination of the Operation 
of Citizens initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP Thesis, University of Auckland, 1996) 81, 
86. 
272 Christine Fletcher (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6714; Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of 
the House of Representatives (20 June 1994) High Court Wellington CP 128/94 Eichelbaum CJ 
6. 
273 See D A M Graham, Minister of Justice and Warren Cooper, Minister of Internal Affairs in 
Alison Tocker "Low Poll Turnout Sparks Rethink of Referendum Rules" (4 December 1995) 
The Dominion Wellington 1; in contrast Gabriela Wehrle "The Firefighters' Referendum -
Should Questions Arising from Industrial Disputes be Excluded from Referenda Held under the 
Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993?" (1997) 27 VU WLR 273, 298-9. 
274 See DAM Graham and Warren Cooper, above, I. 
275 Egg Producers Federation v The Clerk of the House of Representatives, above, 6. 
276 The Chairman of the Electoral Law Committee in 1995, National MP Tony Ryall, said that 
"options could include an independent commissioner or committee to decide whether questions 
were suitable for a referendum": see Brent Edwards "Referendum Law Up for Review" (4 
December 1995) The Evening Post Wellington I; without any statutory criteria, however, this 
seems to be an impossible task. 
277 D A M Graham (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17952; in Italy and California, the courts do 
have the right to declare referendum results unconstitutional, whereas courts in Switzerland do 
not have this right: see Kris W Kobacb The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland 
(Dartmouth, Brookfield, 1993) 4 I; Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri (eds) The 
Referendum Experience in Europe (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1996) I 07. 
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subject-matter restriction on constitutional infringements, the courts clearly would 
have the power and even the obligation to ensure that this provision was not 
breached. 
Secondly, issues that do not lie within Parliament's competence should also 
be excluded beforehand. Petitions, for example, that contravene international 
obligations can evidently not be acted on by the Government. It was observed that 
the demand for "hard labour" in the "criminal justice" petition probably did not 
comply with international standards.278 The Swiss Constitution, therefore, 
stipulates that the Federal Assembly declares initiatives invalid, which violate 
regulations of international law.279 
Thirdly, some issues should be restricted to Government either because of its 
superior knowledge or because it is a matter on which the public would not cast 
an unbiased vote. This would for instance include matters of defence and national 
security as well as tax- and budget matters.280 
The Government saw these problems before the introduction of the CIR Bill 
and therefore chose to implement non-binding referendums only.281 This certainly 
reduces the urgency of amendments of the CIR Act in the above mentioned way. 
However, the confidence of the populace in the political process and CIRs suffers, 
if the Government chooses not to act on the outcome of a referendum. It is 
therefore better to impose limits at the outset in order to reduce arguments and 
annoyance at a later time. 
278 Janet McLean "Making More (or Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-Initiated Referenda" 
in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 366-
7; Mel Smith "Referendum Question Fails Scrutiny" (21 January 2000) Evening Post 
Wellington 7. 
279 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation), art 139 (3). 
280 This would have probably excluded the CIR petition from 30 November 1994: "Should New 
Zealand 's defence expenditure be reduced to half its 1994/95 level by the year 2000 with the 
savings spent on health, education, conservation and the promotion of full employment?". 
28 1 D A M Graham, Minister of Justice (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6704, 6723 ; see for further 
reference Mark W Gobbi The Quest f or Legitimacy: a Comparative Constitutional Study of the 
Origin and Role of Direct Democracy in Switzerland, California, and New Zealand (LLM 
Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 271. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Two years after the introduction of the CIR Act, 20 proposals had already 
been filed. However, in the following six years only 14 more petitions have been 
delivered to the Office of the Clerk. This obvious decline of usage coincides with 
the facts that only three out of these 34 petitions have been successful in 
triggering a public vote and that the Government has not acted on one of those 
three referendums. CIRs were introduced in times of voter disenchantment as a 
means to re-establish public confidence and to control the Government. However, 
the statistics clearly reveal that an instrument that promises public influence 
without the compulsion to keep what it promised can neither re-establish 
confidence in politics nor can it control the Government. Justifiably, many have 
therefore called CIRs a large and expensive public opinion poll.282 Yet, the 
conclusion must not be that CIRs should be binding. Neither does New Zealand 's 
constitutional system have the necessary safeguards, nor does it allow that amount 
of popular sovereignty. 
The examinations of this paper show that a number of things can be 
improved. The person or institution in charge of the referendum process needs 
clear criteria as to how to perform this task. Moreover, for several reasons it is 
questionable if the Clerk of the House is the appropriate institution to perform this 
task. Subject-matter restrictions should be implemented as extensive as possible to 
prevent clearly inappropriate questions from being put to the voters. Furthermore, 
the implementation of provisions concerning voter information is indispensable. 
As a means to increase the voter turnout, moreover, the intensification of the use 
of phone, internet or postal votes is highly desirable. 
However, this paper also reveals that several problems are referendum-
inherent. The increasing complexity of modem politics contrasts with the 
necessity to reduce referendum questions to a yes/no vote. Often, the complex 
issue subverts this necessity for simplicity, making the referendum questions long 
and extremely difficult. Due to educational inequalities among the populace, these 
282 Helena Catt, Paul Harris and Nigel S Roberts Voter 's Choice: Electoral Change in New 
Zealand? (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, NZ, 1992) 141 ; Janet McLean "Making More (or 
Less) of Binding Referenda and Citizens-Initiated Referenda" in Colin James (ed) Building the 
Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2000) 366; Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew 
Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand Government under MMP (3 ed., Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 202. 
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questions favour the more educated voters and clearly overtax the less educated, 
leading in turn to skewed or uninformed votes. The outcome of referendum votes, 
moreover, depends to a great deal on the way a question is couched, placing 
considerable responsibility on the institution in charge. 
CIRs were introduced with the claim to improve and strengthen democracy, 
but have done little to increase the role of the people in the legislative process. 
Apart from the flaws in the Act itself, which is in need of considerable reworking, 
it seems that referendums cannot compete with a Parliamentary process of 
deliberation and compromises. 
Genetic Engineering is a matter of topical interest and arguably among the 
big moral issues that the Government had in mind when it introduced the CIR 
Act. However, the group GE Free NZ recently considered the collection of 
250,000 signatures too onerous and argued that it was the Government's duty to 
hold a referendum on this topic.283 This, and the fact that not a single petition has 
been lodged during the last year, does not bode well for the future of CIRs in New 
Zealand. 
283 "GE referendum crusade canned" (4 September 2002) New Zealand Herald Auckland. 
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APPENDIX I - GOVERNMENT-INITIATED REFERENDUMS* 
No. Date Carrying Issue Effect Turn- Outcome 
out out in 
% 
1 9 March Special Extension of Indicative 56.5 75.5 % opposed 
1949 poll hotel licensing - 6 o'clock 
hours closing retained 
2 9 March Special Allow off- Indicative 65.3 68.0 % in 
1949 poll course betting support of off-
on horse racing course betting 
3 3 August Special Introduce Indicative 61.5 77.9 % in 
1949 poll compulsory support of 
military training peace-time 
conscription 
4 23 Special Extension of Indicative 69.6 64.4 % in 
September poll hotel licensing support of later 
1967 hours closing time 
5 23 Special Extend the Indicative 69.7 68.1 % opposed 
September poll parliamentary - three-year 
1967 term to four term retained 
years 
6 27 General Extend the Indicative 82.4 69 .3 % opposed 
October election parliamentary - three-year 
1990 term to four term retained 
years 
7 19 Special Change the Indicative 55.2 84.7 % in 
September poll electoral system support of 
1992 to some form of change 
proportional 
representation 
Special Voting system Indicative 55.2 70.5 % in 
poll options support of 
Mixed-Member 
Proportional 
system (MMP) 
8 6 General First-past-the- Binding 85.2 53.86 % in 
November election post or Mixed support of 
1993 Member Mixed-Member 
Proportional Proportional 
system system (MMP) 
9 5-26 Postal Introduction of Indicative 80.34 91.8 % opposed 
September ballot compulsory the introduction 
1997 superannuation 
savings 
• Excluding the liquor licensing polls and local referendums; Sources: Colin James and Alan McRobie 
Turning Point: The 1993 Election and Beyond (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 319-20; 
Craig Joseph Press The Case for Binding Citizens Initiated Referenda in New Zealand (MPP 
Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 51-2. 
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APPENDIX II - THE REFERENDUM PROCESS 
---------------·---- - -- - --
\.1''./f'ittc·"l r.,.· 1 opos~: 
I 
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- ---------
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Source: Ministry of Justice Pamphlet on the Citi=ens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 
<http://wwv. .justice.govt.nz pubs, other/pamphlets '2001 citizens referenda.pdf> (last accessed 22 
September 2002). 
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APPENDIX III - CIR PETITIONS 
No. Date Proposer Question Signatures Current status 
Proposal determined to be 
Received collected by 
1 01 Feb 94 Royal NZ Should the 28 Apr 95 Delivered to 
Society for the production of eggs Clerk 
Prevention of from battery hens be Insufficient 
Cruelty to prohibited within signatures 
Animals five years of the (Lapsed) 
referendum? 
2 28 Mar 94 Christian Should a Judge 23 Jun 95 Not returned 
Heritage Party sentencing a person to Clerk 
ofNew convicted of murder (Lapsed) 
Zealand to life imprisonment 
be empowered to 
order that the person 
be imprisoned for his 
or her natural life 
and not be eligible 
for parole? 
3 25 May Michael Laws Should the size of 18 Aug 95 Not returned 
94 MP Parliament be to Clerk 
Hon Winston reduced from 120 (Lapsed) 
Peters MP Members of 
Geoff Parliament to 100 by 
Braybrooke reducing the number 
MP elected from party 
lists? 
4 20 Jun 94 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn Withdrawn 
Democracy 16 Sep 1994 under s 11 (2) 
Movement Represented on 30 (a) (i) CIR Act 
Nov 1994 1993 
5 20 Jun 94 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn Withdrawn 
Democracy 16 Sep 1994 under s 11 (2) 
Movement Represented on 30 (a) (i) CIR Act 
Nov 1994 1993 
6 20 Jun 94 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn Withdrawn 
Democracy 16 Sep 1994 under s 11 (2) 
Movement Represented on 30 (a) (i) CIR Act 
Nov 1994 1993 
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7 20 Jun 94 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn Withdrawn 
Democracy 16 Sep 1994 under s 11 (2) 
Movement Represented on 30 (a) (i) CIR Act 
Nov 1994 1993 
8 20 Jun 94 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn Withdrawn 
Democracy 16 Sep 1994 under s 11 (2) 
Movement Represented on 30 (a) (i) CIR Act 
Nov 1994 1993 
9 20 Jun 94 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn Withdrawn 
Democracy 16 Sep 1994 under s 11 (2) 
Movement Represented on 30 (a) (i) CIR Act 
Nov 1994 1993 
10 29 Aug 94 Mr William Should there be a 17 Nov 95 Not returned 
Maung Maung legally enforceable to Clerk 
requirement that (Lapsed) 
political parties 
observe their 
constitutions and 
their manifesto 
promises? 
11 11 Nov 94 NZ Should the number 9 Feb 96 Delivered to 
Professional of professional Clerk 
Firefighters fire fighters Sufficient 
Union employed full-time signatures 
in the New Zealand Referendum 
Fire Service be held on 2 Dec 
reduced below the 95 as a special 
number employed on poll 
1 January 1995? Tumout28 % 
Outcome 12 % 
yes 
12 30 Nov 94 Next Step Should all New 23 Feb 96 Delivered to 
Democracy Zealanders have Clerk 
Movement access to Insufficient 
comprehensive signatures 
health services (Lapsed) 
which are fully 
government funded 
and without user 
charges? 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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13 30 Nov 94 Next Step Should all New 23 Feb 96 Delivered to 
Democracy Zealanders have Clerk 
Movement access to public Insufficient 
education services, signatures 
from early childhood (Lapsed) 
to tertiary level, 
which are fully 
government funded 
and without user 
charges? 
14 30 Nov 94 Next Step Should full 23 Feb 96 Not returned 
Democracy employment with to Clerk 
Movement wages and (Lapsed) 
conditions that are 
fair and equitable be 
the primary goal of 
government 
economic policy? 
15 30 Nov 94 Next Step Should all New 23 Feb 96 Not returned 
Democracy Zealanders on to Clerk 
Movement income support and (Lapsed) 
benefits get an 
income based on 
what it actually costs 
to live? 
16 30 Nov 94 Next Step Should all increases 23 Feb 96 Not returned 
Democracy in New Zealand's to Clerk 
Movement electricity demand (Lapsed) 
be met from energy 
conservation and 
from the use of 
sources that are 
environmentally 
sustainable? 
17 30 Nov 94 Next Step Should New 23 Feb 96 Not returned 
Democracy Zealand's defence to Clerk 
Movement expenditure be (Lapsed) 
reduced to half its 
1994/95 level by the 
year 2000 with the 
savings spent on 
health, education, 
conservation and the 
promotion of full 
employment? 
18 19 Dec 94 One New Do you agree that 23 Mar 96 Not returned 
Zealand the laws of New to Clerk 
Foundation Zealand should not (Lapsed) 
Inc. discriminate against 
or give preference to 
citizens or 
permanent residents 
of New Zealand on 
the basis of their 
ethnic origins? 
19 15 Sep 95 Voluntary Should people aged 14 Dec 96 Withdrawn 
Euthanasia 18 years and over under s 7 
Society who are terminally Citizens 
(Auckland) or incurably ill be Initiated 
Inc. permitted to have Referenda 
their lives ended if Amendment 
they request this, in a Act 1995 (s 
humane manner and 22A CIR Act 
in accordance with 1993) 
procedures to be 
established? 
20 15 Apr 96 Jim Anderton Should the forestry 13 Jun 97 Delivered to 
MP licenses to 188,000 Clerk 
hectares of Crown Insufficient 
Forest land which signatures 
are currently held by (Lapsed) 
the Forestry 
Corporation of New 
Zealand Limited 
remain in State 
ownership (subject 
to the determination 
of any Treaty of 
Waitangi claims)? 
21 23 Jui 96 Nga Kaitiaki o Should all tree 31 Oct 97 Not returned 
Te Waonui a felling and clearing to Clerk 
Taaneo on any indigenous (Lapsed) 
Aotearoa land ( except in 
plantation forests 
and already 
protected 
conservation areas) 
be prohibited, unless 
such tree felling or 
clearing is in 
accordance with 
Maori customary 
usage? 
22 18 Mar 97 Mark Whyte Should there be a 19 Jun 98 Not returned 
PO Box 21086 written Constitution, to Clerk 
Henderson taking precedence of (Lapsed) 
Auckland the Treaty of 
Waitangi and all 
other sources of Jaw, 
which guarantees the 
rights of all people 
without favour or 
discrimination? 
23 20 Jun 97 Margaret Should the size of 21 Aug 98 Delivered to 
Robertson the House of Clerk; 
PO Box 17411 Representatives be Sufficient 
Karori reduced from 120 signatures; 
Wellington members to 99 Referendum 
members? held on 28 
November 99 
alongside 
general 
election; 
Turnout 82.8 
% 
Outcome 81.5 
%yes 
24 03 Oct 97 Norm Withers Should there be a 15Jan99 Delivered to 
16 Kimberley reform of our justice Clerk; 
St system placing Sufficient 
Christchurch greater emphasis on signatures; 
the needs of the Referendum 
victims, providing held on 28 
restitution and November 99 
compensation for alongside 
them and imposing general 
minimum sentences election; 
and hard labour for Turnout 82.9 
all serious violent % 
offences? Outcome 91. 7 
% yes 
25 13 Oct 97 Cancer Society Should the 11 Dec 98 Not returned 
of NZ Inc. Government increase to Clerk 
PO Box 12145 its annual spending (Lapsed) 
Wellington on health services to 
at least 7 % of GDP, 
funding the increase, 
if necessary, from 
personal income tax? 
26 19 Feb 98 Frederick Should Members of 21 May 99 Delivered to 
Richards Parliament be Clerk 
85 Scott St elected by single Insufficient 
Blenheim transferable vote signatures 
(STY) with (Lapsed) 
constituency-based 
multi-member 
electorates? 
27 21 Dec 98 Gavin Hugh Should there be no 25 Mar 00 Not returned 
Piercy further compulsory to Clerk 
PO Box 284 school closures until (Lapsed) 
Invercargill comprehensive 
criteria have been 
established by law 
for the Minister of 
Education to follow 
when deciding to 
close a school? 
28 06May Julie Waring Should the 12 Aug 00 Not returned 
99 PO Box 42009 Government be to Clerk 
Holmdale required to reduce (Lapsed) 
Wainuiomata the number of 
Wellington unemployed people 
to below I % of the 
labour force by the 
year 2004? 
29 29 Jun 99 The Free New Should New Zealand 140ct00 Not returned 
Zealand Party adopt direct to Clerk 
Society Inc. democracy by (Lapsed 
binding referendum 
whereby ideas for 
laws would be 
submitted and voted 
upon as of right by 
the public and, 
according to the 
result, submissions 
collected from the 
public and then 
assessed by opinion 
poll, resulting in 
draft law alternatives 
being prepared by 
independent groups, 
from which one 
opinion would be 
chosen by majority 
vote by the public; 
the resulting 
legislation to be 
binding? 
30 29 Mar 00 Raymond Should Parliament 6 Jul 01 Not returned 
Lorenzen enact legislation to to Clerk 
17 Cognac ban the sale and (Lapsed) 
Place distribution of 
Henderson tobacco? 
31 18May Tim Hawkins Should the Shared 17 Aug 01 Not returned 
00 PO Box 521 Parenting Bill to Clerk 
Dunedin introduced by Dr (Lapsed) 
Muriel Newman 
(which creates a 
presumption that 
parents who are 
separated or 
divorced will have 
equal rights to 
custody of their 
children) be passed 
by Parliament? 
32 19 Oct 00 Dennis Crisp Proposed Wording: Withdrawn 
Do you believe that under s 11 (2) 
New Zealand should (a) (i) CIR Act 
hold a binding 1993 
referendum on 
whether we should 
replace MMP by a 
return to first-past-
the-post elections? 
33 Jan 01 Stuart FE Should a binding 20 Mar 02 Not returned 
Marshall referendum be held to Clerk 
PO Box to decide the future (Lapsed) 
331495 voting system, based 
Takapuna on a Parliament of 
99 MPs? 
34 26 Jul 01 Ian Wishart Should New Zealand 17 Oct 02 Collecting 
The adopt a written signatures 
Constitution Constitution 
Trust of New expressly vesting 
Zealand sovereignty in the 
PO Box people and 
302188 protecting 
North Harbour fundamental human 
and civil rights? 
Source: Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
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APPENDIX IV - READABILITY OF REFERENDUM PETITIONS 
No Proposer Question determined Gunning's Flesch 
FOG Index Reading 
Ease 
Formula 
1 Royal NZ Society Should the production of 16.4 47.621 
for the Prevention eggs from battery hens be 
of Cruelty to prohibited within five years 
Animals of the referendum? 
2 Christian Should a Judge sentencing a 20.5 34.596 
Heritage Party of person convicted of murder 
New Zealand to life imprisonment be 
empowered to order that the 
person be imprisoned for his 
or her natural life and not be 
eligible for parole? 
3 Michael Laws Should the size of Parliament 10.6 30.533 
MP be reduced from 120 
Hon Winston Members of Parliament to 
Peters MP 100 by reducing the number 
Geoff Braybrooke elected from party lists? 
MP 
4 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn 16 Sep 
Democracy 1994 
Movement 
5 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn 16 Sep 
Democracy 1994 
Movement 
6 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn 16 Sep 
Democracy 1994 
Movement 
7 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn 16 Sep 
Democracy 1994 
Movement 
8 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn 16 Sep 
Democracy 1994 
Movement 
9 The Next Step Proposal withdrawn 16 Sep 
Democracy 1994 
Movement 
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10 Mr William Should there be a legally 23.3 0.922 
Maung Maung enforceable requirement that 
political parties observe their 
constitutions and their 
manifesto promises? 
11 NZ Professional Should the number of 14.6 16.659 
Firefighters professional firefighters 
Union employed full-time in the 
New Zealand Fire Service be 
reduced below the number 
employed on 1 January 
1995? 
12 Next Step Should all New Zealanders 11.8 36.116 
Democracy have access to 
Movement comprehensive health 
services which are fully 
government funded and 
without user charges? 
13 Next Step Should all New Zealanders 14.8 25.796 
Democracy have access to public 
Movement education services, from 
early childhood to tertiary 
level, which are fully 
government funded and 
without user charges? 
14 Next Step Should full employment with 20 30.025 
Democracy wages and conditions that are 
Movement fair and equitable be the 
primary goal of government 
economic policy? 
15 Next Step Should all New Zealanders 12 59.635 
Democracy on income support and 
Movement benefits get an income based 
on what it actually costs to 
live? 
16 Next Step Should all increases in New 19.6 17.674 
Democracy Zealand's electricity demand 
Movement be met from energy 
conservation and from the 
use of sources that are 
environmentally sustainable? 
17 Next Step Should New Zealand's 18.7 15.645 
Democracy defence expenditure be 
Movement reduced to half its 1994/95 
level by the year 2000 with 
the savings spent on health, 
education, conservation and 
the promotion of full 
employment? 
18 One New Zealand Do you agree that the laws of 20.1 39.164 
Foundation Inc. New Zealand should not 
discriminate against or give 
preference to citizens or 
permanent residents of New 
Zealand on the basis of their 
ethnic origins? 
19 Voluntary Should people aged 18 years 21.1 36.627 
Euthanasia and over who are terminally 
Society or incurably ill be permitted 
(Auckland) Inc. to have their lives ended if 
they request this, in a 
humane manner and in 
accordance with procedures 
to be established? 
20 Jim Anderton MP Should the forestry licenses 23.4 4.31 
to 188,000 hectares of Crown 
Forest land which are 
currently held by the 
Forestry Corporation of New 
Zealand Limited remain in 
State ownership (subject to 
the determination of any 
Treaty of Waitangi claims)? 
21 Nga Kaitiaki o Te Should all tree felling and 24.2 5.663 
Waonui a Taane o clearing on any indigenous 
Aotearoa land ( except in plantation 
forests and already protected 
conservation areas) be 
prohibited, unless such tree 
felling or clearing is in 
accordance with Maori 
customary usage? 
22 Mark Whyte Should there be a written 17.3 32.565 
PO Box 21086 Constitution, taking 
Henderson precedence of the Treaty of 
Auckland Waitangi and all other 
sources of law, which 
guarantees the rights of all 
people without favour or 
discrimination? 
23 Margaret Should the size of the House 6.4 37.469 
Robertson of Representatives be 
PO Box 17411 reduced from 120 members 
Karori to 99 members? 
Wellington 
24 Norm Withers Should there be a reform of 23.3 17.169 
16 Kimberley St our justice system placing 
Christchurch greater emphasis on the 
needs of the victims, 
providing restitution and 
compensation for them and . . .. 
1mposmg m1mmum 
sentences and hard labour for 
all serious violent offences? 
25 Cancer Society of Should the Government 16.6 30.703 
NZ Inc. increase its annual spending 
PO Box 12145 on health services to at least 
Wellington 7 % of GDP, funding the 
increase, if necessary, from 
personal income tax? 
26 Frederick Should Members of 16.7 0(-17.352) 
Richards Parliament be elected by 
85 Scott St single transferable vote 
Blenheim (STV) with constituency-
based multi-member 
electorates? 
27 Gavin Hugh Should there be no further 17.1 28,504 
Piercy compulsory school closures 
PO Box 284 until comprehensive criteria 
Invercargill have been established by law 
for the Minister of Education 
to follow when deciding to 
close a school? 
28 Julie Waring Should the Government be 12.9 44.577 
PO Box 42009 required to reduce the 
Holmdale number of unemployed 
Wainuiomata people to below 1 % of the 
Wellington labour force by the year 
2004? 
29 The Free New Should New Zealand adopt 34.9 0 (-10.573) 
Zealand Party direct democracy by binding 
Society Inc. referendum whereby ideas 
for laws would be submitted 
and voted upon as of right by 
the public and, according to 
the result, submissions 
collected from the public and 
then assessed by opinion 
poll, resulting in draft law 
alternatives being prepared 
by independent groups, from 
which one opinion would be 
chosen by majority vote by 
the public; the resulting 
legislation to be binding? 
30 Raymond Should Parliament enact 14.8 32.223 
Lorenzen legislation to ban the sale and 
17 Cognac Place distribution of tobacco? 
Henderson 
31 Tim Hawkins Should the Shared Parenting 18.3 32.735 
PO Box 521 Bill introduced by Dr Muriel 
Dunedin Newman (which creates a 
presumption that parents who 
are separated or divorced 
will have equal rights to 
custody of their children) be 
passed by Parliament? 
32 Dennis Crisp Proposed Wording: Do you 12.7 39.67 
believe that New Zealand 
should hold a binding 
referendum on whether we 
should replace MMP by a 
return to first-past-the-post 
elections? 
33 Stuart F E Should a binding referendum 9.7 45.422 
Marshall be held to decide the future 
PO Box 331495 voting system, based on a 
Takapuna Parliament of99 MPs? 
34 Ian Wishart Should New Zealand adopt a 16 17.335 
The Constitution written Constitution 
Trust of New expressly vesting sovereignty 
Zealand in the people and protecting 
PO Box 302188 fundamental human and civil 
North Harbour rights? 
0 17.4 0 27,12 
KEY 
A On Readability Formulas in General 
Since the late 1940s, reading specialists have created several objective 
measurements of readability. The two most widely used scales are the Flesch 
Reading Ease Scale (Flesch, 1948) and the Gunning Fog Index (Gunning, 1968). The 
application of a formual usually involves the selection of a sample from a text, the 
counting of some easily identifiable characteristics, such as the average number of 
words per sentence or the proportion of polysyllabic words in the sample, and then 
performing a calculation to produce a score. This score indicates the difficulty of the 
sample of text. Some readability formulas produce estimates that represent grade 
levels (FOG Index), others range over a 100 point scale where higher numbers 
indicate greater readability (Flesch Reading Ease Formula). Readability itself can be 
defined as the correlation of reading and comprehensions skills on the one hand and 
the complexity of a text on the other hand or as 
"the the sum total of all those elements within a given piece of printed material that affects the 
success which a group of readers have with it. The success is the extent to which they understand 
it, read it at optimum speed and find it interesting" .1 
Most current research in readability concludes that, whatever "readability" really is, 
it cannot be contained within the narrow limits of sentence length and long words. 
Short, choppy sentences are often harder to follow than a smooth, longer sentence 
with adequate transitions. Long words ("democracy") may often be easier to 
understand than short ones ("watt"). Familiarity with the subject matter and the ease 
of following organisational patterns (by prose signposts) may also be more important 
than more easily quantifiable properties. And passive constructions, negative 
1 John Gilliland Readability (University of London Press, London, I 972) 12-3 . 
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constructions, long noun strings, and nominalisations interfere more with readability 
than do long words by themselves. 
Nevertheless, readability formulas can be computerized and are becoming popular in 
business and industry. However, current readability formulas are simplistic. No 
computer program or readability scale can give a definitive analysis of the 
effectiveness of a piece of writing. The only reliable standard is the reaction of 
sophisticated readers and users. Any use of readability formulas should therefore be 
carefully circumscribed. They are best viewed as statistical approximations, which 
provide rough categorisations of difficulty, but which may easily fail to be valid in 
any specific context. 
B Gunning's FOG Index 
To calculate the FOG Index of a passage, do the following: 
1. Count the number of words in the paragraph, W. 
2. Count the number of sentences in the paragraph, S. 
3. Count the number of hard words of three syllables or more, HW. 
4. Apply the following formula: (W/S + HW/WxlOO)x0.4 
The Fog Index gives the number of years of education that your reader needs to 
understand the paragraph. For reference: 18 being university graduate level and 
beyond, 15 being first year at university, 11 being fifth form (year eleven), and 9 
being third form (year nine) at school. The New York Times has an average Fog 
Index of 11-12, Time magazine about 11 . Professional prose should never, or almost 
never, exceed the upper limit of 18. Technical documentation should aim for a Fog 
Index between 10 and 15 . The Fog Index formula implies that short sentences written 
in plain English achieve a better score than long sentences written in complicated 
language. 
A hard word is a word of 3 syllables or more, but not a word that is ( 1) a 
combination of short words (first-past-the-post); (2) a verb form that becomes 
polysyllabic by adding -ed, -es, or -ing (submitted), or (3) a proper name (Parliament, 
Government, New Zealand). This has been taken into consideration. 
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C Flesch Reading Ease Formula 
The approach to calculating the Flesch score is as follows: 
1. Calculate the average sentence length, L. 
2. Calculate the average number of syllables per word, N. 
3. Calculate score (between 0-100%). 
The Flesch Reading Ease Scale measures readability as follows: 
100 
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0 
Very easy to read. Average sentence length is 12 words 
or less. No words of more than two 
syllables. 
Plain English. Average sentence length is 15 to 20 
words. Average word has two 
syllables. 
Extremely difficult to read. Average sentence length is 3 7 words. 
Average word has more than two 
syllables. 
The higher the score, the easier the text is to understand. 
Sources: Alice Davison and Georgia M Green (eds) Linguistic Complexity and Text Comprehension 
(L Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, N.J., 1988) 5-21; George Roger Klare The Measurement of 
Readability (Iowa State University Press, Ames, 1963) 20-5; John Gilliland Readability (University of 
London Press, London, 1972) 12-3 , 89-93 ; David B Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot 
Propositions in the United States (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 207-8. 
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APPENDIX V - TURNOUT COMPARISON GENERAL ELECTION -SPECIAL 
POLLS 
Country Election/Special poll Voter turnout Dijference 
general 
election -
special poll 
New Zealand Election 1993 83 55 
"Firefighters" referendum 1995 28 
Election 1993 83 28 
Vote on electoral system 1992 55 
Ireland Election 1982 74 19 
Vote on banning abortion 1983 55 
Switzerland Election 10/1991 46 15 
Vote on transport funding and voting 31 
age 3/1991 
Britain Election 1974 73 8 
Vote on staying in EEC 197 5 65 
Sweden Election 1995 86 4 
Vote on joining EU 1994 82 
Philippines Election 5/1987 90 3 
Vote on new Constitution 6/1987 87 
Russia Election 12/1993 50 -5 
Vote on draft Constitution 12/1993 55 
Burundi Election 1993 91 -6 
Vote on new Constitution 1992 97 
Norway Election 9/1994 76 -13 
Vote on joining EU 11/1994 89 
Source: Helena Catt Democracy in Practice (Routledge, New York, 1999) 70. 
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